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ESSAY
CATALOGS
Gideon Parchomovsky* & Alex Stein**
It is a virtual axiom in the world of law that legal norms come in
two prototypes: rules and standards. The accepted lore suggests that
rules should be formulated to regulate recurrent and frequent behaviors,
whose contours can be defined with sufficient precision. Standards, by
contrast, should be employed to address complex, variegated behaviors
that require the weighing of multiple variables. Rules rely on an ex ante
perspective and are therefore considered the domain of the legislature;
standards embody a preference for ex post, ad hoc analysis and are
therefore considered the domain of courts. The rules/standards dichot-
omy has become a staple in economic analysis of the law, as well as in
legal theory in general.
This Essay seeks to contribute to the jurisprudential literature by
unveiling a new form of legal command: the catalog. A catalog, as we
define it, is a legal command comprising a specific enumeration of
behaviors, prohibitions, or items that share a salient common denomi-
nator and a residual category—often denoted by the words “and the
like” or “such as”—that empowers courts to add other unenumerated
instances. This Essay demonstrates that the catalog formation is often
socially preferable to both rules and standards and can better enhance
the foundational values of the legal system. In particular, catalogs are
capable of providing certainty to actors at a lower cost than rules, while
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avoiding the costs of inconsistency and unbridled discretion inimical to
standards. Moreover, the use of catalogs leads to a better institutional
balance of powers between the legislature and the courts by preserving
the integrity and autonomy of both institutions. This Essay shows that
these results hold in a variety of legal contexts, including bankruptcy,
intellectual property, criminal law, torts, constitutional law, and tax
law.
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INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that legal commands come in two
varieties: rules and standards.1 Rules contain a precise formulation of the
proscribed conduct, illustrated by the oft-cited prohibition on “driving [a
car] in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways.”2 Standards, on the
other hand, only provide a generalized description of the proscribed
conduct, as in the case of the prohibition on “driving at an excessive
speed on expressways.”3 Rules come in handy for individuals trying to
1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557, 559–62 (1992) (describing legal system as consisting of rules and standards);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685,
1685–87 (1976) (referring to legal system’s rules and standards); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 379–81 (1985) (referencing rules and standards in legal
system); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217, 1221 (1982) (describing choice
between “formal ‘rules’ [and] open-ended ‘standards’” as “fundamental question in juris-
prudence”); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65,
67–71 (1983) (identifying criteria for selecting rule over standard, or vice versa, in admini-
strative law); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 43–56 (2000) (using behavioral economics to analyze rules-
versus-standards dichotomy); Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules
and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 509, 527–37 (2012) (descri-
bing choice between rules and standards in federal-jurisdiction law).
2. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 560; see Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing
Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 155–56 (1999) (describing Montana adoption
of “‘Basic Rule’ of ‘reasonable and prudent’ daytime driving” as “choice between rules and
standards”).
3. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 560; see King & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 156 (character-
izing Montana’s Basic Rule as example of legal standard).
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figure out whether their contemplated conduct is prohibited or permit-
ted. The same kind of ex ante clarity is not readily available under stan-
dards, whose precise implications for a given course of action are deter-
mined by a court or an agency only after the fact.4 Moreover, the ex post
guidance provided by courts is often confined to the specifics of the case
at hand and does little to clarify the realm of legitimate behavior for
other actors. The unpredictability associated with standards affects not
only wrongdoers, but also law-abiding citizens who wish to act in accor-
dance with the law but cannot readily discern what acts are permissible.
Hence, standards may exert a chilling effect on desirable behavior.5
Formulating rules that identify undesirable conduct with the requi-
site degree of precision is costly.6 Consequently, rules are considered
most suitable for regulating recurrent and relatively homogeneous con-
duct, such as driving a car7 or mining coal.8 When a socially undesirable
conduct is homogeneous and recurrent, the cost of devising a rule that
regulates it will be spread across multiple cases. In each case, actors will
be able to easily find out whether their contemplated conduct is per-
mitted (or prohibited); and the cost of applying the rule by courts will be
low as well.9 As a result, society will be able to recoup its investment in the
formulation of the rule.10 In cases featuring undesirable conduct that
does not form a recurrent pattern, these economies of scale are not
attainable. Hence, in such cases, it is more cost effective to adopt a broad
standard notwithstanding the resulting unpredictability costs for actors
and implementation costs for courts.11
The distinction between rules and standards has preoccupied schol-
ars from different methodological persuasions, spawning a voluminous
4. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 562–63 (underscoring standards’ meanings deter-
mined by courts ex post); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 965
(1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Problems with Rules] (highlighting standards’ ex post
guidance).
5. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 966–67 (1984) (attesting uncertainty
associated with standards may chill desirable conduct).
6. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 569 (“Because of [the cost of determining the
appropriate content of the law ex ante], rules are more expensive to promulgate than
standards.”).
7. Id. at 563–64 (showing rules are best suited to regulate recurrent conduct such as
car driving).
8. Cf. id. (noting utility of rules in areas such as regulations governing health and
safety).
9. Id. at 563 (discussing benefits of rule promulgation and positive effects of rules
on actors’ conduct).
10. Id. (“If there will be many enforcement actions, the added cost from having
resolved the issue on a wholesale basis at the promulgation stage will be outweighed by the
benefit of having avoided additional costs repeatedly incurred in giving content to a stan-
dard on a retail basis.”).
11. Id. (“[W]hen frequency [of regulated conduct] is low, a standard tends to be
preferable.”).
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theoretical literature with many important insights.12 As this Essay will
show, however, the menu of policy tools consists of three, not two,
categories of legal commands. Hidden from view, there exists a third
category that has completely escaped the penetrating gaze of legal
theorists: catalogs. A catalog, as it is defined in this Essay, consists of an
outright ban on a detailed, but incomplete, list of specific activities and a
general prohibition of all activities falling into the same category.
Accordingly, a typical catalog would contain a specific enumeration of
proscribed conduct and a general provision empowering courts to penal-
ize or enjoin other similar activities. Importantly, although this Essay
focuses predominantly on conduct, catalogs are not confined to conduct
that the lawmaker permits or prohibits. Catalogs also may contain a list of
rights, products, assets, defenses, privileges, or itemized deductions.13
Catalogs have a noble provenance. They can be traced back to the
corpus juris of the eighteenth century, where they held pride of place.14
Over time, however, this legal category fell into oblivion among theorists,
and today it is all but forgotten. Yet conceptual categories do not die so
easily, especially when they capture legal phenomena that have contin-
ued vitality and significance. So while catalogs disappeared from the
scholarly canon, they did not disappear from the law.15 In fact, their pres-
12. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1221 (analyzing importance of
choice between rules and standards in battle-of-the-forms provision); Jason Scott Johnston,
Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 256–59 (1995)
(analyzing contracting parties’ selection of rules over standards and vice versa); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54
Admin. L. Rev. 807, 818–26 (2002) (analyzing rules-versus-standards dichotomy in
administrative law); James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 115, 130–43 (2012) (analyzing rules-versus-standards
dichotomy in securities law); James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar
Conversation About Rules vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61
Am. U. L. Rev. 1175, 1183–90 (2012) (using rules-versus-standards framework to analyze
Federal Circuit’s decisions on veterans’ rights); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 69–83
(1992) (examining Supreme Court Justices’ divisions over rules and standards).
13. See infra Part III (illustrating various types of catalogs).
14. An early catalog had already appeared in English law in 1596. See Archbishop of
Canterbury’s Case, (1596) 76 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B.) 519–21; 2 Co. Rep. 46 a, 46 a to 47 a
(determining power granted to King by statute in question over lands of dissolved
colleges). To the best of our knowledge, an American court first used a catalog in
Executors of Barracliff v. Administrator of Griscom, 1 N.J.L. 193, 194–95 (1793) (interpret-
ing statute to determine whether plaintiff was entitled to costs); see also Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 200 (2012) (discussing
early court decisions applying ejusdem generis rule to interpret general concepts appear-
ing in statutes alongside specific concepts as belonging to same kind or category);
Glanville L. Williams, The Origin and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis Rule, 7
Conv. & Prop. Law. (n.s.) 119, 119–24 (1943) (describing origins of ejusdem generis rule).
15. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
599 P.2d 676, 686 n.10 (Cal. 1979) (“[T]he . . . ejusdem generis [rule] . . . states . . . where
general words follow the enumeration of particular classes . . . , the general words will
be . . . applicable . . . only to . . . things of the same general nature . . . [since] if the
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ence in our laws is now more wide ranging and abundant than it was in
the past.16
From a philosophical perspective, catalogs, as concepts and catego-
ries, are predicated on the principle that Ludwig Wittgenstein aptly
called a “family resemblance.”17 Specifically, the enumerated rights, pro-
hibitions, or items in a catalog must have a common denominator or uni-
fying characteristic that reflects people’s linguistic conventions (not just
logic) and is discernible to individual actors and judges. Based on this
common denominator, actors and judges alike ought to be able to con-
strue the general provision that admits of other unenumerated conduct or
items that bear a family resemblance to the enumerated ones. In
deciding whether an unenumerated conduct (or item) comes within the
aegis of the general provision of a catalog, actors and judges must con-
sider the conduct’s (or item’s) proximity to the enumerated conduct (or
items).18
As an illustration of the operation of the family-resemblance
principle, consider the provision in the Bankruptcy Code that denies dis-
charge to a person who perpetrates “fraud,” “embezzlement,” “larceny,”
or, more generally, a “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”19
Back in 1877, the Supreme Court construed this provision’s predecessor20
as a catalog of defaults that share a common denominator: bad-faith
misappropriation of creditors’ money or property.21 In keeping with pre-
cedent, in 2013 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the catalog status of the
defaults provision in a case that centered on the meaning of the omnibus
“defalcation” category.22 In Bullock v. BankChampaign, the Court acknowl-
Legislature had intended . . . [an] unrestricted sense, it would not have mentioned the
particular things . . . which would . . . become . . . surplusage.” (citing Scally v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (Ct. App. 1972))).
16. See infra Part III (discussing use of catalogs in different areas of law). Catalogs
are a subset of analogical reasoning. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 742–43 (1993) (providing general account of analogical
reasoning in law).
17. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 65–71 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell 3d ed. 1967) (1953) (explaining use of “family resem-
blances” descriptor because it encompasses “overlap and criss-cross” of features); see also
Nicholas Griffin, Wittgenstein, Universals and Family Resemblances, 3 Canadian J. Phil.
635, 635–37 (1974) (analyzing “family resemblance” concept).
18. In Wittgenstein’s words, this investigation involves working through a “compli-
cated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail.” Wittgenstein, supra note 17, § 66.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
20. This predecessor is section 33 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which provided that
“no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a
public officer, or while acting in a fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act.”
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878).
21. See Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878) (interpreting common denominator of
bad faith).
22. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013).
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edged that although linguistically the term “defalcation” is broad
enough to encompass any default or failure to meet an obligation,23 the
meaning of the term in the Bankruptcy Code is confined to misdeeds
that have the same traits of blameworthiness as the more specific
misconduct—“fraud,” “embezzlement,” and “larceny”—that appears on
the statutory list.24 Hence, conduct that comes within the meaning of the
“defalcation” category must be akin, although not identical, to its
“linguistic neighbors”: “fraud,” “embezzlement,” and “larceny.”25
Catalogs differ from rules and standards both functionally and
conceptually. Equally importantly, in a broad variety of cases, catalogs can
advance social goals more effectively than either rules or standards. To
illustrate, consider a statutory provision that prohibits “leaving an unat-
tended dog, cat, or another pet” in a parked vehicle.26 Assume that the
goal of this provision is to prevent cruelty to animals. This statutory
prohibition is evidently not a “rule” because “pets” are an open-ended
category open to judicial interpretation. It is clear that “cats” and “dogs”
are members of the protected group of pets. But the list is not closed.
Many other animals, such as rabbits, gerbils, or hamsters, may come
under the term “pets.” But it is impossible to know ex ante whether or
not they do. The courts give an answer on a case-by-case basis. Rules give
courts no such authorization.
Nor is the statute a standard. A standard typically bestows upon a
decisionmaker nearly unfettered discretion, allowing her to consider the
totality of circumstances in a particular case. For example, in construing
the standard “drive at a reasonable speed,”27 a court has the power to
decide that even high-speed driving is reasonable under certain circum-
stances28—for example, when the driver must rush a dying person to the
hospital. The statute we discuss here, however, gives the court no such
power. No matter what the circumstances of the case are, the court is not
authorized to exonerate a person who leaves a cat or a dog unattended
in a parked car.
Nor can the court go in the other direction and expand the pro-
hibition to any animal it deems deserving of protection. Consider the
case of a person who decides to adopt an alligator and subsequently
leaves it unattended in her car. Does the alligator owner violate the
23. Id. at 1758 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009)).
24. Id. at 1759–60.
25. Id. at 1760. The Court also clarified that “defalcation” involves “neither conver-
sion” (unlike embezzlement), “nor taking and carrying away another’s property” (unlike
larceny), “nor falsity” (unlike fraud). Id.
26. This example draws upon section 750.50(2)(e) of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50(2)(e) (West 2011).
27. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 560 (describing “driving at an excessive speed on
expressways” as standard).
28. Cf. id. at 562 (noting adjudicator can attach appropriate legal consequences to
speeding in light of relevant norms or facts).
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statute? The answer is no. Although the statutory language does not
establish a closed list, its use of “cats” and “dogs” as representative exam-
ples restricts the ability of courts to expand the category of pets ad infini-
tum. It instructs the court that the category of pets is confined to animals
that bear functional resemblance to cats and dogs—pets that people
keep in their homes for company, entertainment, or protection and that
fit into a normal household environment.29
The chosen wording only gives courts the weak discretion30 to find
out whether the animal in question is ordinarily used by people as a pet.
Courts exercising this discretion are commanded to carry out a factual
inquiry into people’s general pet usage. The statute does not authorize
courts to base their decisions on normative considerations. In particular,
courts are not allowed to consider whether extending the statutory pro-
tection to alligators would enhance animals’ protection against cruelty.
This limitation of the courts’ power separates the statute from standards.
By our lights, this statute is a catalog.
Our legal system uses catalogs when the cost of formulating a spot-
on rule and the costs of the unpredictability associated with standards are
prohibitively high. Under these conditions, adopting a catalog is socially
optimal. Catalogs can combine the relative strengths of both rules and
standards, while avoiding their respective weaknesses. Specifically, a cata-
log can ban outright recurrent behaviors that are readily identifiable and
use those as a basis for establishing a more general prohibition on activ-
ities falling into the same family or genre. Consequently, catalogs can do
better than standards at creating a zone of certainty for actors at much
lower cost than fully specified rules.
Catalogs also offer a similarly important element of dynamism that is
sorely lacking in rules. Rules are underinclusive or overinclusive by
design.31 No matter how hard legislatures try, they will fail to come up
with fully specified rules that accurately represent every possible contin-
gency in all future states of the world.32 In theory, the list of rules can be
updated to respond to changing conditions. In practice, such updates
are very rare on account of administrative and political costs.33 Fully spec-
29. Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L.
Rev. 1179, 1200–01 (using analogous example with pets to illustrate ejusdem generis rule).
See generally Scalia & Garner, supra note 14, at 199–213 (explaining and illustrating
ejusdem generis canon by which courts interpret statutory rules that this Essay identifies as
“catalogs”).
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31–32 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Rights] (introducing concepts of “weak” and “strong” discretion).
31. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 31–34 (1991) [hereinafter Schauer,
Playing by the Rules] (explaining overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of rules).
32. See id. at 31.
33. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 569, 609 (attesting making rules is costly and may
involve improper political influences and abuse of power).
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ified rules may also be too voluminous and, consequently, too cumber-
some to learn and to follow.34 Catalogs, by virtue of their limited open-
endedness, can be expeditiously and cheaply adapted to accommodate
changes while reducing information costs for actors.35
To be sure, standards offer the same, if not greater, dynamism.
Indeed, standards are so open-ended that they can respond to a broader
spectrum of changes.36 But from an institutional or political perspective,
the malleability of standards is also their bane. Standards give a lot of
power to courts. The more open-ended a standard is, the greater the risk
that courts may construe it in a way that runs afoul of the legislative
intent or fills it with new and unintended meanings as circumstances
change.37 Catalogs allow the legislature to keep the courts’ power in
check, thereby striking a more desirable balance between the legislature
and the judiciary.38
Structurally, this Essay unfolds in three Parts. In Part I, this Essay
reassesses the scholarly debates over rules versus standards and brings
catalogs into play. In Part II, it carries out a comprehensive analysis of
catalogs as compared to rules and standards. In Part III, the Essay exam-
ines the operation of catalogs in criminal law, tort law, constitutional law,
and tax law. A short Conclusion ensues.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RULES AND STANDARDS
The rules/standards dichotomy has captivated scholars’ attention
for many decades.39 Theorists who studied legal commands have formu-
lated their subject of inquiry as a choice between rules and standards.40
Their analyses sought to determine the level of precision that legal
commands should exhibit and the degree of discretion they should
bestow upon courts in order to best promote the legislature’s goals.41
34. See id. at 563–64 (observing rules covering every possible contingency are costly
to promulgate); see also Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of
Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 9 (1993) (“[T]he costs of learning complex
rules may be especially onerous . . . .”).
35. See infra Part II (providing examples of limited open endedness).
36. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 563 (discussing advantage of standards where set-
tings “vary substantially”).
37. Id. at 609 (“Rules may be preferred to standards in order to limit discretion,
thereby minimizing abuses of power.”).
38. See infra notes 110–113, 116–118 and accompanying text (discussing how general
provision in catalog structures court’s discretion).
39. See supra notes 1, 12 and accompanying text (illustrating examples of debate).
For an early exploration of imprecise rules that function as standards, see Charles P.
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 407, 409–11 (1950).
40. See supra notes 1, 12 and accompanying text (discussing various examples of
choice between rules and standards).
41. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1697–98 (arguing lawmakers “can enlist the ener-
gies of the parties in reducing the seriousness of the imprecision of rules”); Sullivan, supra
note 12, at 58–59 (“Standards allow for the decrease of errors of underinclusiveness and
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The conventional scholarly wisdom suggests that rules are commands
that exhibit a high level of precision and, hence, give courts very limited
discretion and, in some cases, no discretion at all.42 Standards, by
contrast, are formulated in general terms and give courts broad
discretion.43 The difference between the two categories of legal
commands is often illustrated by reference to driving. An oft-cited
example of a rule is “drive at a speed no higher than fifty-five miles per
hour,” while a classic example of a standard is “drive at a reasonable
speed.”44
Theorists who investigated the institutional implications of the
choice between rules and standards have shown that rules are assumed,
by hypothesis, to promote the goal of the legislature.45 Rules operate as a
nexus or functional intermediary between the policymaker’s goals and
courts’ decisions.46 In other words, rules are drafted to reflect the goals
the legislature wishes to advance. Hence, courts are supposed to apply
rules automatically without considering whether their decisions will pro-
mote the legislature’s goals.47 Courts should be mindful of those goals in
overinclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards
allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the cir-
cumstances.” (footnote omitted)).
42. See Schlag, supra note 1, at 384 (“Rules draw a sharp line between forbidden and
permissible conduct, allowing persons subject to the rule to determine whether their
actual or contemplated conduct lies on one side of the line or the other.”); Sullivan, supra
note 12, at 62 (noting rules could “reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by
preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular attractive or unattractive
qualities into the decisionmaking calculus” (footnote omitted)); see also Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989) (associating
bright-line rules giving courts no discretion with rule of law).
43. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 1, at 386–87 (underscoring broad discretion courts
have under standards); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 66 (noting standards grant broad discre-
tion); cf. Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 Fordham L.
Rev. 1287, 1288–90 (2006) (arguing rules are preferable to standards because standards
are less definite and poorly suited for governing conduct of nonofficials).
44. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 560 (describing “driving [a car] in excess of 55 miles
per hour on expressways” as rule and “driving at an excessive speed on expressways” as
standard).
45. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1228 (explaining nexus between rules and
lawmaker’s goals); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 585 (discussing rules as government’s informa-
tion disseminating mechanism); see also Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 31, at
218–21 (noting reasons for interpretive focus on legislative intent).
46. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 585 (framing rules as disseminating information col-
lected by legislature to judiciary).
47. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 31, at 4 (“A rule taken by an agent
(or an enforcer) as exerting normative pressure qua rule is therefore not for the agent
wholly optional. The fact of the rule’s existence becomes a reason for action . . . .”);
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 537 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer,
Formalism] (“What makes formalism formal is this very feature: the fact that taking rules
seriously involves taking their mandates as reasons for decision independent of the
reasons for decision lying behind the rule . . . . Rules therefore supply reasons for action
qua rules.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
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ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous rules that are open to more than
one interpretation.48 This decisional mode—systematic application of
“rules qua rules”49—promotes the legislature’s goals.50 For example, by
routinely penalizing drivers who drive their cars at a speed greater than
fifty-five miles per hour, courts will realize the legislature’s goal to deter
dangerous driving.
The relationship between the legislature’s goals and courts’ applica-
tions of standards is more complex.51 Standards specify the legislature’s
ultimate or intermediate52 goals that courts must promote. To properly
apply a standard, courts need to take account of the specific circum-
stances of the case at hand in order to decide how best to promote the
legislative goal.53 For example, when the relevant standard prohibits
“dangerous driving” and evidence shows that the defendant drove her
car at fifty miles per hour on a dark, curvy road in snowy weather, the
court will often do well to categorize the driving as dangerous.
If court procedures were inexpensive and error free, standards
would always outperform rules. Under ideal conditions, standards would
dominate even a most meticulously drafted set of rules. The reason is
straightforward: Formulating a broad standard is cheap, whereas drafting
a comprehensive set of rules is onerous and costly.54 And since theoret-
ically courts apply standards costlessly and in error-free ways, their
decisions will always produce the result desired by the legislature.
However, the assumption that court procedures are costless and error
free does not obtain in the real world. Courts do make mistakes, and
adjudication is expensive. Moreover, broad standards give rise to yet
another concern: When courts are given a broad discretionary power,
they might, at least in theory if not in practice, misuse it for purposes of
personal gain, favoritism, and self-aggrandizement.55
Standards, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 803, 803–04 (2005) (explaining mechanical appli-
cation of rules qua rules).
48. See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 162–63 (2009) [hereinafter
Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer] (listing legislative intent as potential aid in cases of inde-
terminate statutes).
49. Id. at 16–18.
50. Id. at 28.
51. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1705–06 (identifying instances where judges may
employ standards strategically to advance their own goals).
52. Cf. id. (arguing reformers, including judges, might support standard because
they lacked power to implement “their ideal solution”).
53. See Adam I. Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 171, 178–79 (2013) (describing factual circumstances judges must take into
account when evaluating standards).
54. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 595 (explaining when ex ante analysis needed for
rule formulation would be poor investment).
55. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 39 (highlighting potential for court abuse under
grant of broad discretion); see also Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 48, at
192–93 (noting standards can lead to abuse of courts’ discretion).
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Hence, the scholarly consensus is that under realistic conditions, as
opposed to ideal ones, rules are superior to standards in guiding individ-
ual behavior, as well as in enhancing social welfare, since rules reduce
adjudicative costs and minimize the twin risks of judicial error and mis-
use.56 To formulate a rule properly, however, the legislature must identify
every set of facts that calls for the imposition of the relevant duty or
liability. This is a costly and onerous endeavor that legislatures often can-
not undertake.
Consequently, the legislature must often suffice itself with a second-
best solution: It must find the desired tradeoff between precision and
generality and formulate a rule reflecting this tradeoff. Any such rule will
either be too narrow (underinclusive) or too broad (overinclusive).57
The rule will be underinclusive when it fails to cover each and every con-
tingency pertaining to the targeted activity.58 Conversely, the rule will be
overinclusive when it covers activities or circumstances that should ideally
remain unregulated.59 Both scenarios represent a loss to society. When a
rule is underinclusive, some actors who should have been liable for
harms they caused under optimal tailoring would walk away scot free.
When a rule is overinclusive, some actors would be liable for socially
benign (and even beneficial) behaviors that should not have given rise to
liability.
A social planner must, therefore, estimate the total social cost of
excessive and insufficient liability and formulate a rule that minimizes
this cost.60 This cost must aggregate the combined cost of drafting a rule
and implementing it, and the rule’s distortionary effect on actors’ behav-
ior. For example, when driving a car on a highway at a speed that exceeds
fifty-five miles per hour is typically dangerous, and driving at a lower
speed is generally safe, the legislature will do well to formulate a rule that
prohibits driving in excess of fifty-five miles per hour. Yet, and it is critical
to acknowledge this fact, even a well-drafted bright-line rule will invari-
56. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 31, at 145–49 (arguing rules
minimize adjudicative errors, opportunity for misuse, and costs of adjudication); Kaplow,
supra note 1, at 621–23 (arguing rules are economically efficient when law governs fre-
quent conduct); cf. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1776–78 (noting how standards can render
“barbarous body of law” acceptable).
57. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 31, at 31–34 (showing rules are
either underinclusive or overinclusive); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 590–91 (same); see also
Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127
Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1522–35 (2014) (using linguistic theory to demonstrate courts and
attorneys frequently misinterpret opaque verbs).
58. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 591 (explaining underinclusiveness of rules).
59. See id. (explaining overinclusiveness of rules).
60. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 272 (1974) (associating optimal formulation of rules
with smallest cost resulting from rules’ overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness); Barbara
Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in Production of Legal Rules 43, 45–46
(Francesco Parisi ed., 2d ed. 2011) (same).
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ably give rise to the following two costs (or imperfections). First, it will
allow a relatively small number of unsafe drivers who stay within the
speed limit to proceed with impunity.61 Second, it will penalize a small
group of fast but safe drivers and drivers who have a good cause to speed,
for example, because they need to rush an ailing relative to the hospital.
Any time a legislature enacts a rule, it sanctions—albeit unintentionally—
certain socially undesirable acts, and it penalizes—again, unintention-
ally—certain justifiable behaviors.62
Nonetheless, these twin costs of rules are often dwarfed by the
imperfections of standards and the social disutility associated with their
use in place of rules.63 Consequently, adopting a bright-line rule often
represents the best available option.
Critically, the analysis so far has ignored the cost of enacting well-
functioning rules. Rules require precision. In enacting rules, the legis-
lature must accurately identify the circumstances under which the cho-
sen rule will achieve the desired results. This task is easy to articulate but
difficult to carry out. To succeed in this task, the legislature must gather,
analyze, and categorize an enormous amount of information—a process
requiring the expenditure of substantial resources.64 Such an expendi-
ture is only justified when it is smaller than the cost of implementing the
chosen policy in courts on a case-by-case basis.
Designing a bright-line rule will thus be cost effective only when it
relieves courts from the duty to make multiple individualized decisions
implementing the policy. The savings in adjudicative expenses increase as
the number of cases that courts can resolve by applying the rule grows.65
The intuition behind this result is simple: The initial cost of adopting a
rule is a fixed cost, while the benefit represented by the cost savings in
every case increases with each additional decision.66 For that reason, rules
work best when they regulate conduct that is recurrent and homoge-
neous, such as driving a car. Rules regulating such conduct generate
economies of scale through their multiple applications.67
When the regulated conduct is heterogeneous or infrequent, stan-
dards will generally do a much better job than rules in accomplishing a
61. Note, however, that lawmakers can address this problem by regulating other dan-
gerous aspects of driving.
62. This problem tracks the famous distinction between rule- and act-utilitarianism.
See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955).
63. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 621 (detailing advantages of rules relative to stan-
dards for laws governing frequent conduct).
64. See id. at 568–69 (discussing promulgation costs).
65. See id. at 577 (“[T]he greater the frequency with which a legal command will
apply, the more desirable rules tend to be relative to standards.”).
66. See id. (“[P]romulgation costs are borne only once, whereas efforts to comply
with and action to enforce the law may occur rarely or often.”).
67. See id. at 583, 585 (explaining economies of scale associated with rules);
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 33 (same).
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chosen policy goal.68 For an example, consider a wide variety of business
contracts involving many contingencies that the contracting parties can-
not fully anticipate. For such contracts, setting up a broad standard that
requires parties to act in “good faith” is a particularly appropriate “gap
filler.”69 Formulating multiple rules as an alternative to this standard
would either be impossible or prohibitively expensive. The same is true
about abatement of property hazards. Property hazards come in many
varieties that depend on the specific conditions of the land and the
premises. An omnibus provision categorizing landowner “negligence” as
an actionable tort will consequently work better than rules in this
context.70
As already mentioned, the initial cost of formulating broad stan-
dards is much lower than that of drafting rules. But standards have a
serious downside in the form of substantial adjudicative expenses and an
increased risk of judicial misapplication.71 For a small number of cases,
this downside does not represent a big problem since the aggregate cost
is tolerable. However, as the number of cases grows, the welfare calculus
changes, and it may not always be socially beneficial to enact standards
even when the conduct in question is heterogeneous. Under a rules
regime, for example, it is much easier to identify errant adjudicators.72
More generally, by enacting rules, the legislature can simplify adjudi-
cation and dramatically lower the cost of judicial errors. This strategy is
particularly attractive when the available standard uses a complex multi-
factor test for determining the relevant duty or liability. To illustrate this
point, consider the multiple criteria for “consumer confusion” under
68. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 595 (discussing advantages of standards).
69. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 852–53 (2006) (arguing good faith and fair dealing should be
used in contract interpretation); see also Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith from (Some) Contracts, 84 Or. L. Rev. 227, 236–41
(2005) (same); Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 559, 571–72
(2006) (same); Mariana Pargendler, Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary
Duties Reconsidered, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1315, 1317–19 (2007) (same).
70. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 564 (“[Standards should] govern more hetero-
geneous behavior, in which each relevant type of act may be rare. For example, the law of
negligence applies to a wide array of complex accident scenarios, many of which are
materially different from each other and, when considered in isolation, are unlikely to
occur.”).
71. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 31, at 149–50 (noting higher
prospect for judicial errors under standards); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 621–23 (noting
increased cost of adjudication and risk of error under standards); Schlag, supra note 1, at
387 (noting increased risk of adjudicative error under standards).
72. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 47, at 541–42 (noting errors are more easily
detectable under rules); Schlag, supra note 1, at 386 (same).
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trademark law73—criteria that are widely acknowledged to be complex
and costly to administer.74 Replacing these criteria with rules that will lay
down irrebuttable presumptions of consumer confusion, or lack thereof,
could make litigation over trademarks cheaper than it presently is.75
As far as individuals’ primary behavior is concerned, rules vastly out-
perform standards at informing actors about what they are and are not
permitted to do. Our criminal law often capitalizes on this advantage by
formulating prohibitions almost exclusively as rules.76 But notice to
actors is not the only reason that explains criminal law’s unequivocal
preference for rules.77 An additional, and perhaps more important, rea-
son is our mistrust of the government as a law enforcer and protector of
freedoms.78 Standards would give the government too much power to
brand and punish people as criminals.79 For that reason, our constitu-
tional law has adopted a doctrine that voids criminal prohibitions for
73. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1582–84 (2006) (explaining how courts
identify consumer confusion in trademark cases).
74. See Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confusion”:
Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1307,
1336–37 (2012) (attesting “consumer confusion” standard is costly to administer); William
McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 49, 70 (2008) (attributing
high cost of trademark litigation to complexity of confusion inquiry).
75. See Bone, supra note 74, at 1351–53, 1365 (arguing bright-line rules can serve
trademark litigation more effectively than “consumer confusion” standard).
76. See Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the
Entrapment Defense, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1011, 1024 (1987) (citing reasons for reliance on
bright-line rules rather than standards to govern criminal sanctions); Kaplow, supra note
1, at 576 n.43 (noting criminal prohibitions are formulated as rules). But see Abraham S.
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 Yale L.J. 405, 407–09 (1959)
(showing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952), criminalizing conspiracy “to defraud the United
States . . . in any manner or for any purpose,” comes close to a standard); infra note 185
and accompanying text (arguing general prohibition of conspiracy “to defraud the United
States” is open to challenge under rule of lenity and “void for vagueness” doctrine).
77. The notice requirement is fundamental. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 588 (2001) (“A necessary condition of any
free society is the ability to avoid going to prison; one has that ability only if one can know
what behavior will lead to prosecution and punishment.”).
78. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“[T]he
void for vagueness doctrine addresses . . . two connected but discrete due process con-
cerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they . . . act
accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law
do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972))); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Vague-
ness doctrine is an outgrowth . . . of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A
conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute . . . fails to provide . . . fair notice
of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.” (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000))).
79. See Sunstein, Problems with Rules, supra note 4, at 968–69 (arguing rules are
necessary to prevent arbitrary enforcement).
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being vague,80 which precludes legislatures from criminalizing behaviors
formulated as “public mischief” or in similarly broad terms.81 As a cor-
ollary of that doctrine, the rule of lenity requires courts to narrow the
scope of criminal prohibitions that can be interpreted in more than one
way.82
Other advantages of rules go beyond the realm of criminal law.
Rules reduce individuals’ cost of learning the law and planning their
actions.83 Rules also reliably inform individuals about legal penalties, or
lack thereof, pertaining to their endeavors.84 Under standards, individ-
uals’ cost of learning the law—both directly and through legal advice—is
much higher than under rules.85 Worse yet, the unpredictability of how
courts will interpret and apply a standard induces individuals, especially
those who are risk averse, to steer clear of the realm of potential liabil-
ity.86 Consequently, standards may exert a chilling effect on socially desir-
able activities by causing individual actors to abandon endeavors whose
net effect is beneficial.87
The downside of rules as guides of primary activities is closely
associated with Holmes’ famous parable of the “bad man,” who “want[s]
to know the law and nothing else . . . [and] cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.”88 Rules
allow self-seeking individuals to “walk the line” by engaging in conduct
that runs against society’s interest and would be prohibited by a stan-
dard.89 More fundamentally, as Duncan Kennedy perceptively argues in
80. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (explaining vagueness doctrine); Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, supra note 4, at 968 (discussing “void for vagueness” doctrine requiring state
to set forth clear guidance before punishing private conduct); see also John F. Decker,
Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80
Denv. U. L. Rev. 241, 244–45 (2002) (providing overview of vagueness doctrine).
81. See Decker, supra note 80, at 266 (explaining operation of “void for vagueness”
doctrine); Stuntz, supra note 77, at 559–61 (explaining, illustrating, and criticizing “void
for vagueness” doctrine).
82. See generally Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 885, 889–906 (2004) (describing and analyzing rule of lenity); Note, The
New Rule of Lenity, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2420, 2421–27 (2006) (discussing and critiquing rule
of lenity).
83. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 571 (arguing advice is more costly under standards
than under rules).
84. See id. at 585 (commenting rules provide individuals information before they
act); see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 591, 652 (1981) (underscoring rules’ predictability).
85. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 571 (“[A]dvice is more costly under a standard.”).
86. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 5, at 966–67 (arguing vague standards create
overdeterrence).
87. See id. (detailing drawbacks of overcompliance).
88. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).
89. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1695–96 (detailing how rules lead individuals to
take advantage of underinclusion); see also Kelman, supra note 84, at 599 (arguing rules
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his analysis of rules versus standards in the transactional context, rules
foment the culture of self-reliance, alienation, isolation, conformity,
rigidity, indifference, and punitiveness, which is detrimental to people’s
individual and collective well being.90 Standards, on the other hand, help
promote communitarian values that include reciprocity, flexibility, con-
textualization, tolerance, generosity, and empathy.91
As Kennedy explains, however, standards also pose a threat to
people’s well being. They give individuals no rights that could trump the
government’s power.92 They also make the law indeterminable and
expand the government’s opportunities for corruption and tyranny.93
Ultimately, as he and other critical legal scholars have argued, the rules-
versus-standards dilemma is one of several manifestations of society’s
unsettled vision of well being.94 This vision, so goes the argument, is
unsettled because it hopelessly tries to accommodate society’s individual-
istic and communal goals.95
Conceptually, rules and standards form a dichotomous relationship.
In reality, however, our legal system has a broad spectrum of rules that
exhibit different levels of specificity. On that spectrum, fully specified
rules that give courts no discretion whatsoever occupy a relatively small
space. Examples of such rules include speed limits and the constitutional
provision that “neither shall any Person be eligible to [the Office of
President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years.”96
Far more common are rules exemplified by the Lanham Act’s prohib-
ition of “dilution”: acts that diminish a famous trademark’s selling power
or dim its allure.97 The Lanham Act defines two types of dilution for
which tort damages are recoverable: blurring and tarnishment. Blurring
consists of acts that “impair[] the distinctiveness of . . . famous
allow individuals to calculate optimal levels of undesirable behavior still within confines of
law).
90. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1710 (listing bad aspects of rules); see also Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 592 (1988) (“[Under rules,]
all parties are presumed . . . clear-sighted overseers of their own best interests; . . . [they]
tie up all the loose ends that they can, and . . . courts should let the advantages and
disadvantages fall where they may . . . [b]ecause this will encourage people to plan and to
act carefully . . . .”).
91. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1710 (naming advantages to standards).
92. See id. at 1777 (explaining informality can lead to oppression).
93. See id. (discussing informality’s impact on corruption).
94. See id. at 1766–76 (establishing fundamentals of two world visions and social
orders).
95. See id. at 1766–67 (describing effect of competing ideologies of individualism
and altruism). But see Schlag, supra note 1, at 420 (“[B]oth altruism and individualism
can generate arguments for both rules and standards.” (emphasis added)).
96. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. But see Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The
“Easy Case” of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 250, 251, 255–56 (1990)
(arguing it is legally plausible to defend election of underage president).
97. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1034–35 (2006) (discussing
definition of trademark’s “dilution”).
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mark[s].”98 Tarnishment consists of acts that “harm[] the reputation of
[a] famous mark.”99 Application of these rules is far from being as
mechanical and discretion free as a juxtaposition of an elected
President’s age against the constitutional minimum or a comparison be-
tween the statutory speed limit and the speed with which the defendant
drove his car. To apply these rules properly, courts must evaluate whether
the alleged infringer’s actions have diminished the selling power of the
plaintiff’s trademark.100 This evaluation calls for judgment that may go in
either direction—exactly as under standards—but the discretion of the
courts is structured rather than open ended: It is cabined by the pres-
ence and amount of the trademark owner’s harm, actual or antici-
pated.101 This discretion is much narrower than the courts’ power under
quintessential legal standards: “good faith,” “fairness,” “due care,” and
the like.102 Consistent with this understanding, scholars have acknowl-
edged that rules and standards form a continuum that embodies differ-
ent tradeoffs between precision and generality.103
The rules-versus-standards debate is important and insightful. But it
is incomplete. Scholars participating in this debate have failed to explore
the possibility of devising legal commands that integrate the advantages
of rules and standards while minimizing their shortcomings. None of
them has considered whether a legal command can be precise, depend-
able, and yet flexible enough to accommodate case-specific adjustments.
Worse yet, the rules-versus-standards debate has paid no attention to cata-
logs despite their ample presence in the law. As the remainder of this
Essay demonstrates, catalogs combine the virtues of rules with the bene-
fits of standards. They are sufficiently precise, dependable, and flexible
in application. As such, they form a conceptually distinct and socially use-
ful category of legal commands.
II. THE MERITS OF CATALOGS
This Part commences a discussion of catalogs by defining their
structure and subject matter. Catalogs have a uniform structure: two or
more enumerated instances (or items) followed by a general provision
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
99. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
100. See Long, supra note 97, at 1034–35 (“Dilution law’s underlying assumption is
that the unauthorized use of a famous mark by third parties . . . can diminish the mark’s
selling power and value because the mark is no longer associated with a single source.”).
101. See id. at 1057–59 (discussing exemptions from actionable harm under statute).
102. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1688 (providing examples of standards and stating
how judges apply them).
103. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 61 (“These distinctions between rules and stan-
dards, categorization and balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide.”); James G. Wilson,
Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line–Balancing Test Continuum, 27 Ariz.
St. L.J. 773, 778 (1995) (describing multiple “forms of doctrine that co-exist along the
rules/standard continuum”).
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that empowers courts to recognize other unenumerated instances (or
items) that have the same key characteristics as the enumerated ones.104
As far as their subject matter is concerned, catalogs run the full gamut of
legal subjects and concepts. Catalogs may refer to actors, behaviors,
prohibitions, rights, duties, powers, immunities, privileges, assets, and
expenditures.
The enumerated section of a catalog operates as a rule. For exam-
ple, in making a decision under the Bankruptcy Code provision that
denies discharge to a debtor who perpetrates “larceny,”105 the court
needs to determine whether the debtor’s misconduct falls under the
definition of larceny. Specifically, the court needs to determine whether
the debtor took “another’s property, with the intent to steal and carry it
away.”106 Under the same statutory provision, the court must follow a
similar procedure in verifying whether the debtor committed “embezzle-
ment” or “fraud.”107 To this end, the court must juxtapose the debtor’s
conduct against the definitions of “embezzlement” and “fraud” under
applicable state or federal laws.108 At first glance, the general category of
“defalcation” resembles a standard, but in fact it operates in a completely
different fashion. As explained earlier in Part I, standards require courts
to identify the policy goal the legislature sought to promote and then
apply the standard to the case at hand in a way that is consistent with the
relevant policy goal.109
The general provision of a catalog poses a very different task. In
construing the general provision of a catalog, courts must confine their
analysis to the specific enumeration that precedes this provision. Further-
more, the courts’ task is not to identify some broad policy goal, but
rather to discern the common denominator of the enumerated items.
Once the common denominator has been established, all that is left for
the courts to do is to determine whether the particular case confronting
them comes within (or falls outside) the category of the enumerated
items.
104. Typically, the catchall category follows the enumerated settings, entitlements, and
duties, but this need not always be the case. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 14, at 204–05
(discussing variations in ejusdem generis sequencing).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012) (prohibiting discharge of individual debtor
from debt for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or
larceny”).
106. People v. Williams, 305 P.3d 1241, 1247 (Cal. 2013) (quoting People v. Gomez,
179 P.3d 917, 920 (Cal. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (prohibiting discharge of individual debtor from debt
for “fraud . . . while acting in a fiduciary setting [or] embezzlement”).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012) (specifying penalties for embezzlement); id. § 1001
(specifying penalties for fraud).
109. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (discussing how standards accom-
plish legislative policy goals).
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In other words, the construction of the general provision of a cata-
log involves comparative analysis rather than a general policy implemen-
tation. For example, in deciding whether the debtor’s misconduct falls
into the catchall “defalcation” category under the Bankruptcy Code,110
the court is neither authorized to expand this category in a way that best
deters debtor defaults, nor does it have the power to interpret “defalca-
tion” narrowly so as to allow as many debtors as possible to get the cov-
eted discharge and start managing their finances from a clean slate.111
Under a standard, the court would have had the power to promote one
of those policies or, alternatively, strike a balance between deterrence
and discharge. However, the statute we are dealing with is a catalog and
not a standard.112 For that reason, the “defalcation” category can encom-
pass only misconduct that is equivalent to “larceny,” “embezzlement,” or
“fraud.” Each misconduct consequently must involve bad-faith misappro-
priation of another person’s money or assets.113
Occasionally, the enumerated items in a catalog will have more than
one common characteristic. In such cases, context plays a pivotal role.
The linguistic meaning of words or terms may vary in different contexts,
as well as among communities and institutions.114 Therefore, judges must
be sensitive to the context of the catalog and its underlying legislative
purpose. For example, in the case of the Bankruptcy Code’s debtor-
default provision, one might argue that the concepts of “larceny,”
“embezzlement,” and “fraud” coalesce around the victim’s harm rather
than the wrongdoer’s scienter or guilty mind. Under this understanding,
the general “defalcation” category should include both malicious and
nonmalicious misappropriation of another person’s money or assets.
Although linguistically possible, this understanding pays no regard to the
provision’s punitive goal and the inherently malicious nature of larceny,
embezzlement, and fraud.115 These factors set up the context for eliciting
110. For the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “defalcation” as a catchall category
under the Bankruptcy Code, see supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
111. Cf. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary pur-
poses of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.’” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236
U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915))).
112. See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (requiring fraud and embezzle-
ment “involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong”); In re Sokol, 170 B.R. 556, 560–61
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (requiring fraudulent intent in commission of larceny that makes
debt).
114. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (acknowledging “funda-
mental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the mean-
ing of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used”).
115. See, e.g., In re Dauterman, 156 B.R. 976, 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (“[T]he
exceptions to discharge tend to punish the dishonest debtor, requiring recompense in
accordance with the actual loss sustained.”); see also Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 782
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the common characteristic of the enumerated defaults and the corre-
sponding meaning of “defalcation” as involving the debtor’s bad faith.
Following Dworkin’s taxonomy, the general provision in a catalog
can be described as giving courts a weak (or limited) discretion.116 The
discretion here is weak—rather than strong, as is the case under a
standard117—because courts’ decisions must stay within the perimeter
demarcated by the catalog’s enumerated instances and their common
denominator. As under rules, courts need to stay within that perimeter.
Save for exceptional cases that involve insufficiently specified catalogs,
courts need not consider the effect of their decisions on the legislature’s
policies. In filling the general or residual provision of a catalog, by con-
trast, a court must engage in a series of interpretive moves from conjunc-
tion to categorization to commonality.118 Via this interpretive process, the
court categorizes the catalog’s enumerated instances by their common
characteristic and then employs this characteristic as a unifier by reading
it into the general provision. This process creates conceptual coherence
between the general provision and the enumerated instances, ensuring
that the general provision is interpreted to include unenumerated in-
stances of the same legal family as the enumerated ones. The enumer-
ated core instances simultaneously guide the court as to how to expand
the catalog and constitute an important constraint on the court’s inter-
pretive power.
Unlike rules, catalogs do not stay frozen in time. Rather, they grow
and develop through a process of accretion. In this sense, catalogs share
the dynamism that characterizes standards. When a court decides that an
unenumerated case or instance comes within the general provision, it
puts it on equal footing with the instances that were expressly specified
by the legislature. Every time a court expands the list of cases in a
catalog, it provides further guidance to future courts that must go
through the same interpretive process. And as the list of cases grows, it
becomes easier for future courts to decipher the conceptual common-
ality that underlies the catalog.
Importantly, this interpretive process can never be driven by logic
alone.119 Consider again the term “defalcation” in the discharge-denial
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.120 As far as logic is concerned, this
(9th Cir. 2004) (“The remedy of denial of discharge punishes debtors for misconduct in
the bankruptcy process.”).
116. See Dworkin, Rights, supra note 30, at 31–32 (coining and explaining concept of
“weak discretion”).
117. See id. (coining and explaining concept of “strong discretion”).
118. See George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal
About the Mind 5 (1987) (explaining categorization as move from conjunction to
commonality).
119. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text (describing use of experience
and prototyping rather than merely logic).
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (enumerating exceptions to debt discharge).
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term can be understood as including negligent mismanagement of
another’s assets.121 The dictionary meaning of “defalcation” includes not
only embezzlement, but also any default or “failure to meet a promise or
an expectation.”122 The fact that all other misdeeds listed in the statute—
fraud, larceny, and embezzlement—include a scienter element does not
logically require that this element be transposed into “defalcation” as well.
Negligent mismanagement of a trust is bad enough to deny bankruptcy
discharge to the defaulting trustee. For purposes of bankruptcy-discharge
policies, it could certainly be put on the same footing with fraud, larceny,
and embezzlement.
Attaching scienter to the “defalcation” default, however, is dictated
by the catalog’s rationale. Unintentional mismanagement of another’s
assets does not belong to the same category of misdeeds that includes
fraud, larceny, and embezzlement. Fraud, larceny, and embezzlement
form the same category because all of them involve ill will or scienter. For
that reason, “defalcation” must also incorporate ill will or scienter in
order not to become an outlier within the statutory catalog. Fraud, lar-
ceny, and embezzlement have “family resemblance” that must be shared
by the “defalcation” misdeed as well.
We use the “family resemblance” concept following Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s classic idea in the philosophy of language.123 Wittgenstein
recognized that categories can be linguistically meaningful without
having clear boundaries defined by common characteristics.124 His core
example was the “game” category that encompasses amusement games
that have no winners or losers (“ring-around-the-rosy”) and competitive
games that involve only luck (roulette), or only skill (chess), or luck and
skill (backgammon).125 There is no single common denominator—a
unifying combination of properties—that connects those games together,
and yet all of them are properly called “games.” “Games” and all other
categories are formed by family resemblances.126 As George Lakoff puts
it, “Members of a family resemble one another in various ways: they may
share the same build or the same facial features, the same hair color, eye
color, or temperament, and the like. But there need be no single
collection of properties shared by everyone in a family.”127
This insight is not merely philosophical: It also represents the
mainstream of cognitive science. Multiple studies of human cognition,
121. See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1165–66
(11th Cir. 2012) (noting circuit split regarding scienter requirement for defalcation),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).
122. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 590 (1993).
123. See Wittgenstein, supra note 17, §§ 65–71 (establishing family-resemblance
concept).
124. Id. § 65.
125. Id. § 66 (using games example to illustrate family resemblances).
126. Id.
127. Lakoff, supra note 118, at 16.
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empirical and experimental alike, have shown that categories do not
exist “in the world independent of people and defined only by charac-
teristics of their members and not in terms of any characteristics of the
human.”128 Rather, human categorization and the formation of language
in general are matters of experience, imagination, perception, and
repeated motor activities.129 When people construct and interpret cate-
gories, they do not use reason as a disembodied logical “manipulation of
abstract symbols.”130 Instead, they use their cognition and imprecise lan-
guage to grasp and communicate about their physical and social environ-
ment.131 For that reason, logic is merely one of the factors that make
categories intelligible.132 Other factors, functionally far more critical than
logic, are family resemblances and prototypes: the core members of a
given category that form catalogs as well.133 As a result, human categories
have no fixed boundaries.134 As under Wittgenstein’s theory, those cat-
egories are extendable: They can be refined and modified as people’s
experience and goals undergo evolution.135
This insight has three important implications for legal catalogs. First
and most importantly, catalogs can integrate the advantages of rules and
standards while minimizing their shortcomings. The Bankruptcy Code’s
discharge-denial provision once again provides a pertinent example.
Formulating a similar provision as a rule would be detrimental to the
Bankruptcy Code’s goals, which include prevention of frauds and timely
discharge of deserving debtors.136 The rules framework cannot accommo-
date such open-textured concepts as “defalcation” nor can it feasibly
128. Id. at 8; see also Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in Cognition and
Categorization 27, 36–37 (Barbara B. Lloyd & Eleanor Rosch eds., 1978) (discussing
empirical studies supporting theory that boundaries between categories depend on
human perceiver).
129. See Lakoff, supra note 118, at 8 (“[H]uman categorization is essentially a matter
of both human experience and imagination . . . .”).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 12 (suggesting properties of categories arise from human experience in
physical and social environments).
132. See id. at 8 (discussing multifarious sources of human categorization).
133. Id. at 12 (discussing roles of family resemblances and prototypes in categoriza-
tion); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 551, 552 (2010)
(“The family resemblance thesis is the claim that the diversity of interpretive phenomena
is structured by a series of common features, no one of which is shared by all of the
activities that we call ‘interpretation.’”).
134. See Lakoff, supra note 118, at 16–17 (discussing extendibility of boundaries for
certain categorizations such as “game”).
135. See id. (illustrating expansion of boundaries using videogames and expansion of
numbers).
136. See Andrea Johnson, Note, Bankruptcy—The Defalcation Exception to
Discharge: Should a Fiduciary’s Mistake Prohibit a Discharge from Debt?, 27 W. New Eng.
L. Rev. 93, 99–102 (2005) (discussing Bankruptcy Code’s goals of relieving “honest but
unfortunate debtor[s]” who have not committed fraud (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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itemize each and every instance of intentional misappropriation.137 Any
rule that the legislature may decide to set up would therefore system-
atically miss the mark. Courts applying this rule would either grant
discharge to fraudulent debtors (when the rule is too narrow) or deny it
to deserving debtors (when the rule is too broad).
The legislature would do no better if it set up a broad “defalcation”
standard instead of a rule. This standard would give courts a free hand to
grant or deny a bankruptcy discharge. Inconsistent application of the
standard might breed uncertainty and undermine public trust in the
judicial system. Favoritism and other forms of judicial misuse may also
arise. Moreover, along with the risk of bankruptcy that accompanies
legitimate businesses, any such standard could chill entrepreneurship.138
Financial risk is strong enough a factor in and of itself to discourage new
business. Combining it with a reduced prospect of bankruptcy discharge
might stifle entrepreneurial activities that could benefit the economy.
Adopting a catalog provision largely sidesteps these problems. The
catalog’s enumerated defaults—fraud, larceny, and embezzlement—
function similarly to rules. The accompanying general provision—
defalcation—attenuates the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
problems associated with rules. Critically, it attenuates these problems
without bringing back the shortcomings of standards. As already explain-
ed, the general “defalcation” category will not be determined by broad
legislative policies, as it would have been under a standard.139 Rather, it
will be filled in by the “family resemblances” of fraud, larceny, and
embezzlement.140
Second, the “family resemblance” predicate allows the legislature to
set up catalogs in a wide variety of contexts as a viable substitute for rules
and standards. The legislature can devise a catalog for virtually any pur-
pose so long as it can formulate two or more prototypical instances that
have a salient common characteristic that judges and jurists can discern
and understand, and more importantly, that the courts can use to imbue
the general provision with additional content by recognizing unenumer-
ated items, or cases, as belonging to the same conceptual category.141
Take evidence law for example. Evidence law contains a funda-
mental principle that prohibits plaintiffs, defendants, and prosecutors
from portraying their adversaries as bad persons who act in accordance
137. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (discussing impossibility of using
bright-line rules to determine defalcation).
138. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (detailing potential high costs of
standards and potential chilling effects).
139. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text (discussing goals that standards
advance and catalogs do not).
140. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (explaining family-resemblance
method).
141. For illustrations, see infra Part III.
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with their bad character.142 At the same time, a person’s prior bad acts
often provide information that factfinders can properly use without
stereotyping the person as bad or ill disposed.143 To make this infor-
mation admissible as evidence, the lawmaker created a catalog: Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). It provides that “[character evidence] may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.”144 This provision is a catalog for an obvious reason: The
words “such as” indicate that “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident” are
not the only facts that bad acts can properly prove.145 Rather, “motive”
and so forth are the paradigmatic scenarios in which bad-act evidence
will be admissible.146 These scenarios are the prototypical components of
the catalog that help courts identify the analogous, but unlisted,
scenarios in which bad-act evidence should be admitted as well.147 These
scenarios include any facts that are propensity free.148 In Part III below,
we provide many other real-world examples that illustrate the workings of
catalogs in different areas of the law.
The third implication has to do with catalogs’ extendibility or open-
ness. Catalogs have open textures, just as rules and standards. Hence,
similarly to rules and standards, which sometimes overlap with each
other, catalogs sometimes overlap with rules and with standards. Catalogs
overlap with rules when they have a well-articulated list of instances that
courts can supplement in a more or less technical way through appli-
cation of logic or calculation. Under such catalogs, courts can fill in the
catchall provision while carrying out a limited “family resemblance”
142. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), (b)(1) (stating character and prior-bad-conduct
evidence not admissible to prove action in conformity); see also Alex Stein, Foundations of
Evidence Law 184–85 (2005) [hereinafter Stein, Foundations] (“The generalization
underlying character evidence—‘bad people are prone to commit crimes’—is exceedingly
general. It purports to prove too much and, therefore, proves nothing.”); Barrett J.
Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121
Yale L.J. 1912, 1950–55 (2012) (developing scheme for identifying and suppressing
dispositional and moralized character evidence).
143. See Stein, Foundations, supra note 142, at 185–86 (explaining evidence of prior
conduct should be admitted when it proves case-specific and propensity-free fact).
144. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
145. Id.
146. Stein, Foundations, supra note 142, at 185–86.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1018–20 (3d Cir. 1988) (mention-
ing paradigmatic admissibility cases listed in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) and
allowing prosecution to prove mafia boss’s extortionary activities by his involvement in
murders showing his “tight control over an organization capable of executing those who
incurred his displeasure”).
148. See Stein, Foundations, supra note 142, at 185–86 (contrasting character evi-
dence with case-specific proof, which involves no generalizations about how bad people
act).
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analysis.149 A vivid illustration of such a catalog can be found in the Clean
Air Act provision that identifies as hazardous nearly 200 air pollutants,
while adding that “any unique chemical substance that contains the
named chemical . . . as part of that chemical’s infrastructure” shall be
deemed hazardous as well.150 Under this catalog, an expert’s identi-
fication of the banned chemical in the unenumerated compound can fill
in the catchall provision. This catalog therefore comes close to a bright-
line rule.
Catalogs’ overlap with standards, which occurs when catalogs fill in
the general category by reference to “family resemblance,” is possible
only in some cases but not in others. This will often happen when courts
are required to make complicated multistage determinations. In such
cases, a catalog may govern one determination, while a broad standard
may govern another.
Consider the “fair use” defense in copyright law:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including wheth-
er such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.151
This provision requires courts to carry out a two-step analysis.152 The first
step consists of the determination of whether a certain category of uses
qualifies, in principle, as fair. This threshold determination, embodied in
the preamble of section 107, has the defining characteristics of a catalog.
The preamble contains an open list of six illustrative uses—criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research—that are presumptively fair.153 All
149. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (defining and explaining “fam-
ily resemblance”).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2012).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
152. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1291, 1298–99 (1998)
(describing two-layer structure of § 107 while arguing statutory words here are not being
taken seriously by courts).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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enumerated uses are referential in the sense that they rely on access to
preexisting expressive materials. Courts are at liberty to add to the list of
presumptively fair uses. In exercising this power, however, they ought to
ensure that the new uses, too, are referential,154 and they cannot add uses
willy-nilly.
At the second step, the courts address the specific nature and cir-
cumstances of the borrowing done for one of the purposes specified in
the catalog in the preamble of the section or for an equivalent unenu-
merated purpose. This decision categorizes the borrowing as decidedly
fair or impermissible.155
Fairness, of course, is a paradigmatic example of a standard. How-
ever, to structure the inquiry and guide courts in the difficult task of
deciding which particular acts of copying are fair, the statute specifies
four tests or questions that frame the fairness analysis. Within this frame-
work of a structured standard, the court will balance the copyright
owners’ property interest against society’s interest in the optimal use of
expressive works.156
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that catalogs offer the
legal system the certainty and predictability of rules and the flexibility of
standards. Moreover, catalogs also can attenuate the overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness problems engendered by rules and the problems
of abuse and malleability associated with standards. These features make
catalogs attractive on the general theoretical level. The extent to which
catalogs can improve the functioning of the legal system in its specific
areas is a separate question. We now turn to examining this question.
III. CATALOGS IN THE LAW
This Part shows that catalogs are a common feature of our legal
system. Within the limited scope of this Essay, this Part is unable to pro-
vide an exhaustive list of all legal catalogs.157 Instead, it sets forth a few
representative examples chosen from four broad legal fields: criminal
law, tort law, constitutional law, and tax law. This Part also identifies real-
154. Cf. Weinreb, supra note 152, at 1298–99 (asking whether uses in statute are pre-
sumptively fair use or require factor analysis).
155. Cf. id. (stating interpretation of § 107 depends on reading of presumptive factors
as exclusive catalog or interpretive tools with factor analysis).
156. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31
(1984) (“‘[S]ection 107 offers some guidance . . . . However, the endless variety of situa-
tions . . . precludes the formulation of exact rules . . . . The bill endorses the . . . general
scope of . . . fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine . . . [since] courts
must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations . . . .’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 65–66 (1976))); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use
Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1484 (2007) (explaining fair-use defense).
157. For additional examples, see supra notes 19–25, 136–140, 142–150 and accompa-
nying text (bankruptcy, evidence, and environmental law).
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world cases in which catalogs provide a superior alternative to rules and
standards.
A. Criminal Law
Criminal law is a natural starting point for the discussion of catalogs
in the law.158 Catalogs pervade the criminal law. They predominantly
appear in statutes that prohibit possession and manufacture of weapons,
intoxicants, and other contraband.
Begin with a common catalog of criminally prohibited dangerous
weapons that includes “any pistol or other firearm (or imitation thereof)
or other dangerous or deadly weapon (including a sawed-off shotgun,
shotgun, machine gun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher knife, switchblade
knife, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false knuckles).”159 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals used the catalog form of the pro-
hibition to resolve the following question: Is a defendant who cruelly hit
his wife’s head against a stationary toilet bowl guilty of assault with a
dangerous weapon and/or malicious disfigurement while armed?160 The
court gave this question a negative answer.161 Drawing on the interpretive
maxim that “‘[a] word is known by the company it keeps,’”162 the court
determined that a toilet bowl does not belong in the family of dangerous
weapons because the enumerated prototypical examples “do not include
stationary objects or anything resembling them.”163 The court reasoned
that the defendant’s crime falls outside the catalog notwithstanding the
fact that it was no less life threatening than assault with a dangerous
weapon.164 This reasoning, as explained in Part II, distinguishes catalogs
from standards:165 Pure policy analysis, the hallmark of standards, would
have led to the opposite result in this case.
158. For insightful analysis of the rules-versus-standards problem in criminal law, see
Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 611, 636–47 (2011)
(addressing tension between need for both flexibility and rigidity in law of white-collar
crime).
159. D.C. Code § 22-4502(a) (Supp. 2014).
160. See Edwards v. United States, 583 A.2d 661, 663–68 (D.C. 1990) (analyzing statu-
tory language and precedent from District of Columbia and other jurisdictions).
161. See id. at 668 (“[W]e hold that the government failed as a matter of law to prove
that [the defendant] committed his crimes with a dangerous weapon.”).
162. Id. at 664 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 667–68 (“The question before us is not whether [the victim] could be
injured as seriously by having her head slammed against a stationary toilet bowl as she
could if she were bludgeoned with a detached one; she obviously could.”).
165. For a similar decision, see State v. Rackle, 523 P.2d 299, 303 (Haw. 1974) (holding
“other deadly or dangerous weapon” appearing in dangerous-weapons catalog includes
only “instruments closely associated with criminal activity whose sole design and purpose is
to inflict bodily injury or death,” and does not include flare guns carried aboard boats to
expedite rescue efforts); see also State v. Patterson, 200 S.E.2d 68, 69 (S.C. 1973) (inter-
preting statutory catalog prohibiting possession of “‘engine, machine, tool . . . or other
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Consider next the Hawaii Penal Code’s provision, which states that
“[a] person commits the offense of promoting intoxicating compounds
[when she] knowingly” commits acts such as:
Breath[ing], inhal[ing], or drink[ing] any compound, liquid,
or chemical containing toluol, hexane, trichloroethylene, ace-
tone, toluene, ethyl acetate, methyl ethyl ketone, trichloroeth-
ane, isopropanol, methyl isobutyl ketone, methyl cellosolve
acetate, cyclohexanone, or any other substance for the purpose
of inducing a condition of intoxication, stupefaction, depres-
sion, giddiness, paralysis or irrational behavior, or in any man-
ner changing, distorting or disturbing the auditory, visual or
mental processes . . . . A person also commits the offense of pro-
moting intoxicating compounds when she sells, delivers or gives
any such substance to a minor.166
A question arose as to whether the selling of alcohol and tobacco
constitutes a violation of the provision. The Hawaii Supreme Court inter-
preted the general term “any such substance” as referring to “any other
substance similar to the enumerated specific compounds.”167 Based on
this understanding, the court decided that “any such substance” includes
only volatile organic liquids that are used as industrial solvents and does
not include alcoholic beverages and tobacco.168
We posit that this decision is correct. One could easily think of policy
reasons that favor the inclusion of alcoholic beverages and tobacco on
the list of prohibited intoxicants, given that the statute criminalizes the
delivery of those intoxicants to minors. However, the provision in ques-
tion is a catalog, not a standard. Therefore, in filling in the general “any
such substance” category, courts should use the “family resemblance” cri-
terion rather than policy.169 The Hawaii Supreme Court did exactly that.
For another illustration, consider the federal statute that prohibits
possession of child pornography. Under this statute, whoever “knowingly
possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, 1 or more books,
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain
any visual depiction [of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct]” is
implement or thing adapted, designed or commonly used for the commission of burglary,
larceny, safecracking or other crime’” as not encompassing forged checks, I.D. cards, and
credit cards (citation omitted)).
166. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 712-1250(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
167. State v. Kahalewai, 541 P.2d 1020, 1026 (Haw. 1975) (emphasis omitted).
168. See id. (noting specific terms described volatile organic solvents commonly used
“in gasoline, glues, cleaning fluid, and various types of paint”—certainly not “food or
beverage”).
169. For an example of policy reasoning resorted to under standards, see eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning
courts should use broad discretionary standard for granting injunctive relief in patent-
infringement suits to deny that remedy to firms using patents solely to extort “exorbitant”
licensing fees from others).
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guilty of a crime.170 Nearly eighteen years ago, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined the meaning of the general
term “other matter” that appears in the statute.171 It held that “other
matter” includes computer disks and drives and all other physical media
capable of containing images.172 The court’s reasoning properly used the
“family resemblance” method, as opposed to the antipornography policy
that supported the same result in the case at bar.173
Catalogs can be put to a broader use. Indeed, we anticipate greater
recourse to catalogs following the virtual disappearance of standards
from our criminal law for reasons specified below.174 The shortcomings of
rules and the unavailability of standards will drive legislatures toward
catalogs as a form of choice.
In criminal law, the form of prohibitions and punishments matters
nearly as much as their substance. This centrality of form is a conse-
quence of the rule of lenity and the constitutional “void for vagueness”
doctrine. The rule of lenity holds that, when a criminal prohibition has
two or more plausible meanings, courts should adopt the narrowest
meaning that minimizes the prohibition’s effect.175 The “void for vague-
ness” doctrine, in turn, provides that “a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”176 These
provisions constrain the government’s power to criminalize individuals’
conduct along two critical dimensions: notice and power.177
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(4)(B) (2012).
171. See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 747–48 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing whether
“other matter” means computer hard drives containing image files or image files
themselves).
172. See id. at 748 (“The statute indicates that at a minimum, a ‘matter’ must be capa-
ble of containing a visual depiction.”).
173. For explanation of “family resemblance,” see supra notes 17–18 and accompa-
nying text (discussing relevance to catalogs).
174. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (describing application of “void for
vagueness” doctrine and rule of lenity to criminal-law standards).
175. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2932–33 (2010) (explaining and
employing rule of lenity); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398,
406–07 (1999) (adopting narrow meaning of “any official act” in bribery statute to avoid
prohibiting benign behavior, such as gifting of jerseys from championship sports teams to
President); see also supra note 82 (providing background material on rule of lenity).
176. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see supra notes 78–81
(providing background material on “void for vagueness” doctrine).
177. See Alex Stein, Corrupt Intentions: Bribery, Unlawful Gratuity, and Honest-
Services Fraud, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 2, 2012, at 61, 78 [hereinafter Stein,
Corrupt Intentions] (discussing lenity rule and “void for vagueness” doctrine working in
concert to inform statutory interpretation).
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The Due Process Clause in the Constitution obligates the govern-
ment to give individuals clear notice as to what conduct it prohibits178
and voids legal setups that allow the government to prosecute and punish
people at will.179 As a corollary of this constitutional injunction, when the
government prosecutes a defendant under a statutory provision open to
more than one interpretation, the court should interpret the provision in
the defendant’s favor.180 Based on these interconnected provisions, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision, Skilling v. United States,181 forced into
virtual redundancy the honest-services-fraud offense, which is formulated
as a “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of hon-
est services.”182 The Court ruled that a defendant can only be convicted
of honest-services fraud when he receives a bribe or a kickback payment
as part of the “scheme or artifice.”183 As a result, the offense now almost
completely overlaps the crimes of bribery and illegal gratuity.184
This construction of the rule of lenity and of the “void for vague-
ness” doctrine makes it virtually impossible for legislatures to lay down
criminal prohibitions in the form of standards.185 Standards are likely to
run afoul of the constitutional protections granted to defendants on
account of their breadth and the almost unfettered discretion they grant
to courts and prosecutors, which makes standards liable to invalidation.
As a result, rules become the form of choice for most criminal prohi-
bitions. But, as explained in Part I, rules are invariably overinclusive or
underinclusive.186 Consequently, drafting criminal prohibitions as rules
makes those prohibitions too broad or too narrow. Consider again the
178. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (noting statute “must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties”); see also Stuntz, supra note 77, at 588 (“[N]o one may be convicted of a crime
without fair notice.”).
179. See Stein, Corrupt Intentions, supra note 177, at 78 (noting “void for vagueness”
doctrine “invalidates criminal statutes . . . allowing the government to prosecute individ-
uals almost at will”).
180. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932–34 (explaining function of rule of lenity).
181. 130 S. Ct. 2896.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
183. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2930–31. But see Stein, Corrupt Intentions, supra note 177,
at 80 (arguing definition of honest-services fraud was not actually vague).
184. See Stein, Corrupt Intentions, supra note 177, at 62 (“This interpretation created
an overlap between bribery and unlawful gratuity on the one hand, and honest-services
fraud on the other.”). But this overlap is not absolute. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n.45
(“Overlap with other federal statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. The principal
federal bribery statute, § 201, for example, generally applies only to federal public offi-
cials, so § 1346’s application to state and local corruption and to private-sector fraud
reaches misconduct that might otherwise go unpunished.”).
185. Some criminal prohibitions are still formulated as standards. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (criminalizing conspiracy “to defraud the United States . . . in any manner or for any
purpose”). Any such provision is open to challenge under the lenity and “void for vague-
ness” rules.
186. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
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honest-services-fraud statute.187 This statute is formulated as a standard,
but the Supreme Court narrowed it down to a rule by interpreting
“scheme or artifice” as requiring bribery.188 The resulting rule, however,
is too narrow. Under this rule, courts had to acquit a mayor who used his
control over the city’s redevelopment plan to secure discounted acqui-
sition of city-owned properties for his girlfriend189 and a state senator
who entered into a profitable consultancy agreement with a medical cen-
ter that had an interest in his official activities.190 As an alternative to that
rule, Congress could legislate a broad prohibition penalizing any unre-
ported agreement or arrangement that promotes a public official’s pri-
vate benefit. This rule, however, would be too broad. Criminalizing every
concealed conflict of interest might discourage talented people from
joining the public service.
This legislative problem can be resolved by formulating a catalog
that prohibits all kinds of bribery and similar behavior. This catalog
would prohibit public officials from “receiving any pecuniary benefit in
exchange for acting or making a decision in his or her official capacity”
and from “making any similar transaction or arrangement.” Under this
catalog, courts would interpret the residual prohibition of “similar trans-
action or arrangement” as criminalizing conduct analogous to bribery.
This interpretation would cast a broader net and deter officials’ miscon-
duct better than the Supreme Court’s construction of the honest-services-
fraud offense. For example, under the proposed catalog’s interpretation,
courts would have to convict the mayor and the senator who managed to
quash their convictions in the two cases mentioned in the previous para-
graph.191 Critically, courts’ decisions on whether the defendant’s behavior
constitutes a “similar transaction or arrangement” would involve no pol-
icy analysis. Instead, courts would fill in the residual category of bribery-
like misconduct by using the “family resemblance” method.192 The avail-
ability of this method would mute any complaint about vagueness that
defendants might raise. An adequately drafted catalog is neither vague
nor malleable. Hence, it would be immune against challenges that can
be raised against criminal standards under the lenity and “void for vague-
ness” provisions.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
188. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932–33.
189. See United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 321–24, 339 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
Government did not prove that fraud occurred by means of bribes or kickback as is now
required by Skilling.”).
190. See United States v. Coniglio, 417 F. App’x 146, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2011) (overturn-
ing guilty verdict under Skilling because jury instructions suggested defendant’s conceal-
ment of conflict of interest met definition under § 1346).
191. See id. (quashing conviction of honest-services fraud under Skilling); Riley, 621
F.3d at 339 (same).
192. See supra notes 123–126 and accompanying text (detailing family-resemblance
doctrine and extendibility of boundaries).
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B. Torts
The American torts system consists predominantly of standards. The
best known example is probably negligence—the touchstone of liability
for accidents that cause harm to another person.193 The negligence stan-
dard is commonly defined as failure to take precautionary measures com-
mensurate with the magnitude of the expected harm.194
Accidents caused by defective products are governed by a system of
strict liability. For liability to attach, however, a plaintiff must prove that
the product was defective, i.e., that the product’s safety fell below the
“state of the art”195 or was inconsistent with “rational consumers’ expec-
tations.”196 Breach of the applicable standard establishes a prima facie
case of liability. The victim, for her part, must avoid unreasonable self-
endangerment. Whether she endangered herself unreasonably is deter-
mined under a negligence standard. Unreasonable self-endangerment by
the victim (labeled as comparative or contributory negligence) reduces,
and sometimes altogether eliminates, the tortfeasor’s duty to redress the
harm.197 These general standards do not govern the entire realm of torts.
They are supplemented by a few harm-specific standards that define
battery, assault, false imprisonment, infliction of emotional distress, libel,
and some other intentional torts.198
For reasons articulated in Part I, the tort system does not have many
bright-line rules.199 The legislature cannot identify in advance all damag-
ing incidents that call for an imposition of the compensation duty and
specify them in a statute that actors can easily learn. Certain risky activi-
ties, however, are best regulated by rules, and the system consequently
uses rules to regulate those activities. These rules lay down detailed safety
requirements for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, cars, and some other
products and services.200
193. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 112, at 263–66 (2000) (describing negli-
gence as foundational requirement for tort liability).
194. See id. § 115, at 270–71 (discussing judicial definition of negligence as “unrea-
sonably risky conduct”).
195. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third
Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 889, 917
(2005) (describing “state of the art” standard).
196. See id. at 897–98 (describing “consumer expectation” standard).
197. See David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. Rev.
1, 18–20 (2000) (describing user-misconduct defenses as grounded on self-endangerment
rationale).
198. See Dobbs, supra note 193, §§ 24–27, at 47–52, § 28, at 52–54, § 33, at 63–64,
§ 36, at 67–69, § 303, at 824–26, § 400, at 1117–19 (discussing elements of battery, assault,
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and intentional torts
generally).
199. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (articulating costs of formulating
rules for heterogeneous conduct and benefits of use of standards).
200. See generally Dobbs, supra note 193, §§ 133–136, at 311–22 (outlining effects of
state and federal statutes on tort liability); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The
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But the tort system employs catalogs as well. Consistent with our
theory, the system uses catalogs when it cannot realize its goals effectively
enough by setting up a rule or a standard. We exemplify this pivotal
point with the help of the Equine Activities Liability Acts, which have
been adopted by many states.201 A typical version of the Act provides,
inter alia: “No equine activity sponsor, equine professional, doctor of vet-
erinary medicine, or any other person, is liable for an injury to or the
death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activi-
ties.”202 Under this Essay’s taxonomy, this provision constitutes a catalog:
It enumerates the specific actors who receive immunity against liability
for horse-riding accidents and adds a general clause granting the immu-
nity to other actors with equivalent characteristics.
This catalog substitutes for a general “assumption of risk” standard
that courts previously used in allocating the responsibility for horse-
riding accidents.203 Courts used this standard to deny redress to horse
riders who sustained injuries from participating in equestrian competi-
tions and shows.204 This standard is substantively correct, but it also has a
serious vice: It is too general and unspecified. As such, it gives courts a
very broad power that opens up a possibility for error and abuse, while
providing little guidance to equine professionals, entrepreneurs, and
riders.
In theory, the tort system could fix these twin problems of unpre-
dictability and excessively broad discretion by substituting the standard
with fine-grained rules.205 But the cost of doing so would swamp the
benefits. To devise well-functioning rules, the legislature would have to
identify in advance every set of circumstances that justifies the denial of
compensation to an injured horse-rider. This task is too onerous. It is
equally hard to identify all actors who should be able to defend against
the rider’s suit by successfully asserting assumption of risk, as so many
different categories of actors affect the terrain and conditions in eques-
trian competitions (as shown in the ensuing paragraph). For these rea-
sons, the system formulated the needed immunity as a catalog.
Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.
645, 649–51, 664–65 (2001) (describing promulgation of clinical guidelines and outlining
growing use of these guidelines as benchmark for determining medical malpractice).
201. See Sharlene A. McEvoy, The Rise of Equine Activity Liability Acts, 3 Animal L.
201, 215 (1997) (reporting widespread adoption of Equine Activity Liability Acts).
202. S.D. Codified Laws § 42-11-2 (2004).
203. See Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434, 439–40 (S.D. 1999) (explaining
Equine Activity Liability Act allocates damages from horse-riding accidents to rider on
assumption-of-risk grounds).
204. See Culver v. Samuels, 37 P.3d 535, 537 (Colo. App. 2001) (denying redress to
injured horse rider); Muller v. English, 472 S.E.2d 448, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
205. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text (discussing twin risks to standards
and ability of rules to avoid such risks).
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In 1999, the South Dakota Supreme Court issued an important
decision that illustrates the operation of catalogs. The case arose from a
tragic accident. A young woman rode a horse across her club’s riding
pasture, when suddenly, the horse tripped, somersaulted, and crushed
the woman beneath it to her death.206 An investigation had indicated that
the horse tripped because it stepped into a cable trench dug by a
telecommunications company, AT&T.207 The woman’s parents filed a
wrongful death suit against AT&T. AT&T invoked the equestrian immu-
nity, arguing that it was covered by the general clause “any other person”
and hence it could not be held accountable for the rider’s death.208
The court disagreed. The expression “any other person,” it explain-
ed, does not refer to all people.209 Had the legislature intended to grant
the immunity to all people, it would not have expressly enumerated
equine-activity sponsors, equine professionals, and veterinarians among
its recipients.210 Actors falling into the category of “any other person”
must therefore share some common characteristic with the enumerated
prototypical immunity holders.211 This characteristic, according to the
court, is the actor’s involvement in equestrian sports and entertain-
ment.212 Because AT&T was lacking this characteristic, it fell outside the
scope of “any other person.”213
The court’s interpretation of the catalog of immunity holders vividly
illustrates Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” principle.214 By extending
the equestrian immunity to “any other person” on top of equine entre-
preneurs and professionals, the legislature made the immunity very
broad. However, as the court rightly decided, this immunity is not all-
encompassing.215 Specifically, it is not broad enough to encompass AT&T
and other telecommunication companies that install their infrastructure
on riding pastures and have no other connection with equestrian sports
206. See Nielson, 597 N.W.2d at 436–37.
207. Id. at 437.
208. Id. at 439.
209. See id. (“Therefore, the meaning of ‘any other person’ is discerned by consider-
ing the context in which it is used.”).
210. Id.
211. See id. (noting general words “‘will be construed as applying only to things of the
same general class as those enumerated’” (quoting In re Grievance of Wendell, 587
N.W.2d 595, 597 (S.D. 1998))).
212. See id. (defining common characteristic as “involve[ment] in equine activities”).
213. Id. at 440.
214. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (defining and explaining “fam-
ily resemblance”).
215. See Nielson, 597 N.W.2d at 439 (“Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, ‘any
other person’ is limited to other people involved in equine activities and does not extend
blanket immunity.”).
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and entertainment.216 There is no “family resemblance” between those
companies and the prototypical immunity holders listed in the catalog.
On the other hand, actors who can prove the relevant family resem-
blance can fend off suits by successfully asserting the equestrian immu-
nity. For example, spectators who cause a horse to run by blowing a trum-
pet or a security company that services the premises and mistakenly
allows its alarm to go off and spook horses into panic should have immu-
nity under the section. These actors fall into the “any other person”
category because they are associated with equine activities through
patronage and business. Spectators who come to enjoy the show and root
for specific horses and riders, and who oftentimes pay for their admission
to the show, are an integral part of the equestrian entertainment busi-
ness. The provider of security services to the club and its riding facilities
is part of the equine entrepreneur’s operation. The rider consequently
assumes full responsibility for the accident risks they create.
Importantly, the court had no need to account for policy implica-
tions in order to deny the immunity to AT&T.217 All it needed to do is
ascertain—as a factual matter—that there is no “family resemblance”
between telecommunication companies and the prototypical holders of
the immunity: equine entrepreneurs and professionals. As explained in
Part II, this policy-free decision is the core virtue of legal catalogs, as con-
trasted with standards.218
To illustrate a different torts catalog, consider the Texas statute that
limits the state’s liability for road hazards to cases in which authorized
officials had actual knowledge of the unabated hazard, while stipulating
that this limitation does not affect the state’s “duty to warn of special
defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or
streets.”219 The Texas Supreme Court applied this catalog to a case involv-
ing a motorist who lost control of her vehicle while crossing a patch of
loose gravel, collided with an oncoming truck, and died at the scene.220
In the ensuing tort suit against the Department of Transportation, the
deceased’s husband alleged that the defendant failed to issue the requi-
216. See id. at 439–40 (“[I]t is clear that the legislature intended to encourage equine
activities by providing to those involved immunity from liability for injuries arising out of
the unavoidable risks of equine activities. That purpose is not advanced by allowing
AT & T to take refuge under the statutes . . . .”).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 109–111 (discussing how catalogs block policy
rationales).
218. See supra notes 136–150 and accompanying text (articulating benefits of catalogs
compared to rules and standards).
219. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b) (West 2011).
220. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d 844, 845 (Tex. 2009).
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site “special defect” warning.221 He claimed that loose gravel on a road
was a “special defect” within the meaning of the statute.222
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. It ruled that the “special
defects” category includes road hazards equivalent to the enumerated
prototypical hazards: excavations and obstructions.223 The court explain-
ed that “[a] layer of loose gravel on a road does not . . . fit within the
same class as an obstruction or excavation”224 because it “does not form a
hole in the road or physically block the road like an obstruction or
excavation.”225 That is, there is no “family resemblance” between loose
gravel, on the one hand, and obstructions and excavations, on the other
hand. Based on this reasoning, the court reversed the lower court’s judg-
ment for the plaintiff and dismissed the suit.226
We agree with the court’s decision. The court was correct to carry
out a conceptual comparison of the relevant hazards—enumerated and
unenumerated—and to base its decision on the hazards’ commonalities
and differences. This is precisely what courts ought to do when faced
with a catalog, as opposed to a rule or a standard.
The foregoing discussion has an important normative implication
for tort policy. The tort system would do well to increase its use of
catalogs as a substitute for the negligence227 and strict-liability standards.
To this end, it could develop a list of precautions capable of preventing a
particular type of accident and supplement this list with a catchall pro-
vision permitting actors to take “any equivalent or similar precaution.”228
To properly formulate such a catalog, the legislature would have to
determine which precautions are most suitable for the given type of
accident. Safety experts from different industries and disciplines should
221. See id. at 846 (describing wrongful-death suit against Texas Department of
Transportation).
222. See id. at 848 (observing plaintiff submitted jury instruction containing standard
of care associated with special defect). It appears that the plaintiff was unable to prove that
the defendant had actual knowledge of the gravel hazard. See id. (noting plaintiff
declined to seek jury findings on issue of actual knowledge).
223. See id. at 847 (“[T]he central inquiry is whether the condition is of the same
kind or falls within the same class as an excavation or obstruction.”).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 848.
227. See supra notes 70, 193 and accompanying text (describing negligence as
standard used in tort law).
228. See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 381(1)(a) (McKinney 2005) (“Every motorcycle,
driven upon the public highways of this state, shall be provided with . . . a suitable and
adequate bell, horn or other device for signaling . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Regulations, Standard No. 201, available at http://
www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/import/FMVSS/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (requiring specified types of vehicles “meet phase-in requirements
for vehicle upper interior components, including, but not limited to, pillars, side rails,
roof headers and the roof”).
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be able to assist the legislature with these determinations. Catalogs
formulated in this way would allow the system to realize the benefits of
both rules and standards, while minimizing their shortcomings.229
C. Constitutional Law
Catalogs are part and parcel of constitutional law as well. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, they played an important role in
shaping the contours of states’ power to invest public funds. On a
number of occasions, citizens came to court to challenge the authority of
local irrigation districts to raise capital by issuing bonds and to buy shares
in private companies.230 The basis for those challenges was a state consti-
tution provision:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, municipality,
or other subdivision of the state shall ever give or loan its credit
in the aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or
otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation, or
become a subscriber to, or a shareholder in, any company or
corporation or become a joint owner with any person, company,
or corporation, except as to such ownerships as may accrue to
the state by operation or provision of law.231
The citizens argued that their local irrigation districts should be
considered “other subdivision[s] of the state,” and hence have no auth-
229. For additional examples of torts catalogs, see, e.g., Massachi v. City of Newark
Police Dep’t, 2 A.3d 1117, 1125, 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (interpreting protec-
tion of “telephone [companies] . . . or any employee, director, officer, or agent of any such
entity” in state’s immunity statute for 911 service, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:17C-10(d) (West
2010), as fending off tort suits regarding “mechanical or logistical failures . . . and not
[suits handling or dispatching of calls]”); Lucero v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc., 39
P.3d 739, 745–47 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting “or any other recreational purpose”
in state’s statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 17-4-7 (1978), to limit liability of landowners allowing
use of their land for “hunting, fishing, trapping . . . or any other recreational use” as
excluding competitive team sports in public schools, and holding schools are not
immune); Hise v. City of North Bend, 6 P.2d 30, 32–34 (Or. 1931) (interpreting munici-
pality’s charter provision precluding city’s tort liability in connection with defective main-
tenance of “any sidewalk, street, avenue, boulevard, alley, court or place” as not extending
to a municipal wharf).
230. See Day v. Buckeye Water Conservation & Drainage Dist., 237 P. 636, 638–39
(Ariz. 1925) (holding irrigation districts are not “subdivision[s] of the state”); Thaanum v.
Bynum Irrigation Dist., 232 P. 528, 530–31 (Mont. 1925) (same).
231. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 7 (amended 1998), available at http://azmemory.azlibrary.
gov/cdm/fullbrowser/collection/statepubs/id/19452/rv/compoundobject/cpd/19456 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Mont. Const. of 1889, art. 13, § 1, available at http://
courts.mt.gov/content/library/docs/1889cons.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The state’s investment power under the Arizona Constitution underwent no changes until
today (subject to a minor linguistic revision). See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 7. The parallel
Montana Constitution provision was reformulated into a rule that prohibits the state from
investing public money other than retirement funds in private corporate capital stock. See
Mont. Const. art. 8, § 13(1).
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ority to engage in the disputed transactional activities.232 This argument
was unsuccessful. Two supreme courts—Arizona’s233 and Montana’s234—
have rejected it. The Montana Supreme Court explained that the phrase
“other subdivision of the state” does not encompass all subdivisions of
the state.235 Rather, it “means other subdivision of the state of the same
general character as a county, city, town, or municipality.”236 The com-
mon denominator of the enumerated members of the catalog—county,
city, town, and municipality—is the power to levy general taxes.237
Because irrigation districts had no such power and could only impose
special assessments on landowners in order to pay for the irrigation
system’s construction and maintenance, the court held that they are ex-
cluded from the catalog and hence not prohibited from making private
market investments.238
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with that reasoning,239 while
adding a more generalized distinction between irrigation districts and
the enumerated state actors. The majority explained that “[c]ounties,
cities, towns, and municipalities all belong to a class of subdivisions of the
state primarily established for what are commonly called political and
governmental, as aside from business purposes[,]” whereas “irrigation
districts and similar public corporations, while in some senses subdivi-
sions of the state, are in a very different class . . . [whose] function is
purely business and economic, and not political and governmental.”240
Our second example is more contemporary. In 1995, Oregon passed
a statute imposing mandatory limits on contributions to state political
campaigns.241 Residents, including a lobbyist, corporations, and a polit-
ical action committee petitioned to the Oregon Supreme Court asking it
to void the statute for violating their constitutionally protected freedom
of political expression.242 The Secretary of State defended the statute’s
232. See Day, 237 P. at 638 (noting objection to funding plan because irrigation dis-
tricts should be considered “other subdivision[s] of the state”); Thaanum, 232 P. at 529–30
(same).
233. Day, 237 P. at 638–39.
234. Thaanum, 232 P. at 530–31.
235. Id. at 530.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 530–31.
238. Id. (“[The] irrigation district has not . . . the authority to impose general
taxes . . . [because] an irrigation district was not in the contemplation of the framers of
our Constitution . . . .”).
239. See Day v. Buckeye Water Conservation & Drainage Dist., 237 P. 636, 638 (citing
with approval analysis of constitutional provision in Thaanum, 232 P. at 528).
240. Id.
241. See Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 773–74 (Or. 1997) (describing measure
and challenges to it).
242. See id. at 774 & n.3 (“Petitioners . . . assert . . . [the statute] limits[s] or ban[s]
certain political campaign contributions and coerce[s] political candidates to agree to
limit their campaign expenditures.”); see also Or. Const. art. I, § 8 (“No law shall be
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constitutionality based on the legislative assembly’s power under article
II, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution to “‘enact laws . . . prescribing
the manner of regulating, and conducting elections, and prohibiting
under adequate penalties, all undue influence therein, from power, brib-
ery, tumult, and other improper conduct.’”243 He argued that the words
“other improper conduct” should be read to allow the legislature “to
enact laws that restrict campaign contributions and expenditures.”244
The court disagreed. After finding that “many—probably most—”
contributions to political campaigns and candidates are a form of expres-
sion protected by Oregon’s Constitution,245 it went on to determine the
meaning of “other improper conduct” in elections.246 The court decided
that misconduct captured by this general phrase must be similar to the
enumerated election misconduct: “power,” “bribery,” or “tumult” that
exert undue influence on the voter.247 This enumerated misconduct, it
explained, “interferes with the . . . act of voting itself, rather than with
the far broader concept of political campaigning”; and thus, “other
improper conduct” includes only those actions that have the effect of
hindering or preventing the voting process.248 Campaign financing con-
sequently falls outside the constitutional catalog of election misconduct.
Our third and final illustration is the “open fields” doctrine that
removes an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.249 The Fourth Amendment grants this pro-
tection to people’s “‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”250 The term
“effects” that appears in this constitutional provision is not general. As
the Supreme Court explained, “effects” that the government cannot
search or seize without a warrant or probable cause include only person-
al, as opposed to real, property.251 Consequently, the government is free
passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,
or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse
of this right.”).
243. Vannatta, 931 P.2d at 779 (quoting Or. Const. art. II, § 8).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 776–78. This holding aligns with the recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), which held that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from restricting political contributions by corpor-
ations, associations, and labor unions.
246. Vannatta, 931 P.2d at 781–84.
247. Id. at 782.
248. Id.
249. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1984) (holding Fourth
Amendment protection does not extend to open fields).
250. Id. at 176 (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
251. Id. at 177 n.7 (“The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be lim-
ited to personal, rather than real, property.” (citing Doe v. Dring, (1814) 105 Eng. Rep.
447 (K.B.) 449; 2 M. & S. 448, 454; 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *16, *384–*385)).
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to trespass on any open fields and gather evidence incriminating their
owner.252
The Court’s holding that “effects” do not include land253 made the
“open fields” doctrine potentially inapplicable under state constitutions
that protect people’s property or “possessions” against unreasonable
searches and seizures.254 When a person owns open fields, those fields are
part of her property and possessions. Arguably, this characteristic leaves
open fields with the same protection against searches and seizures as per-
sons, houses, and papers.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted this argument in a
case involving a hunter who set up an unlawful bait to hunt a bear.255
Evidence proving this accusation was collected from the hunter’s camp
by Wildlife Conservation Officers, who acted without a warrant.256 The
camp was unoccupied but “posted with ‘No Trespassing’ signs.”257 The
defendant argued that the trial court ought to have suppressed this evi-
dence because it had been obtained in violation of his right to privacy
under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.258 This consti-
tutional provision protects people against warrantless searches and sei-
zures “in their persons, houses, papers and possessions.”259 The defen-
dant claimed that this formulation rejects the federal doctrine of “open
fields” because the term “possessions,” unlike “effects,” is broad enough
to include land.260
The court sided with the government.261 The court ruled that the
general term “possessions” is not a free-standing concept.262 Rather, it is
part of a list—or catalog, according to this Essay’s taxonomy—that
itemizes three specific areas of protection that belong to an individual’s
252. Id. at 177; see also Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 (“[T]he special protection accorded by
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not
extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as
the common law.” (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV)).
253. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
254. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 8 (extending Fourth Amendment protections to
“possessions”).
255. See Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1200 (Pa. 2007) (explaining defen-
dant violated Pennsylvania’s Game Code, 34 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2308(a) (West 1997)).
256. See id. at 1200–01 (discussing investigation).
257. Id. at 1201.
258. Id. at 1202–03.
259. Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
260. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1202–05.
261. See id. at 1213 (“[W]e hold that the guarantees of Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution do not extend to open fields; federal and state law, in this area,
are coextensive.”).
262. See id. at 1205–06 (“Like the word ‘effects’ in the Fourth Amendment, ‘posses-
sions’ appears as the last among four objects in which the people have a right to be secure,
the others being their ‘persons,’ ‘houses,’ and ‘papers.’ (quoting Pa. Const. art. I, § 8)).
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intimate space: “persons,” “houses,” and “papers.”263 The term “posses-
sions” therefore also belongs to that space.264 “If ‘possessions’ had been
intended to refer to everything one owned, such as open fields,” explain-
ed the court, “then there would have been no need to specify the other
three objects.”265
Constitutional law does not use catalogs as often as does criminal
law. As explained in Part III.A above, criminal law uses catalogs to fix the
failings of rules within the constitutional framework inimical to stan-
dards.266 By the same token, constitutional law will do well to intensify its
use of catalogs in a sociolegal climate that promotes dynamism while
retaining the centrality of the text and the nexus between the Framers’
project and our current system of governance.267 Catalogs are well suited
to prevent the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of constitutional
rules while avoiding the legitimacy problem associated with judges’
interpretations of broad standards.268
D. Tax Law
Catalogs play an important role in tax law as well. They close loop-
holes while preventing taxes from becoming unpredictable (as under
standards) or excessive (as under rules).269 To see how tax catalogs work,
consider the deductible casualty loss under § 165(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.270 This provision allows a taxpayer to deduct from her
taxable income losses from theft, as well as “losses of property not con-
nected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if
such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty.”271 This
provision constitutes a catalog under our definition: The general cate-
gory of “other casualty” encompasses casualties that belong in the same
family as the three enumerated casualties—fire, storm, and shipwreck.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1206.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 175–192 and accompanying text.
267. To see how this legal climate is envisioned, see Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism
3 (2011) (“The method of text and principle is both originalist and living
constitutionalist.”).
268. See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 375, 391 (2013) (“Excessive judicial discretion has been a recurring concern in
American political history.”); cf. Balkin, supra note 267, at 6 (“The text of our
Constitution contains different kinds of language. It contains determinate rules . . . . It
contains standards . . . . And it contains principles . . . .”). As shown in this subpart of the
Essay, constitutional law also includes catalogs.
269. See, e.g., Estate of Herrmann v. Comm’r, 85 F.3d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1996)
(explaining chosen interpretation of tax catalog by need to close loophole).
270. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2012).
271. Id.
206 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:165
This understanding guided the Eleventh Circuit’s precedential deci-
sion Maher v. Commissioner, which involved taxpayers who lost twenty-two
coconut palm trees that grew on their property due to a lethal yellowing
disease.272 The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayers’ request to
reduce their taxable income on account of this loss.273 The tax court
agreed with the Commissioner, and the taxpayers appealed.274 The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, ruling that the “other casualty”
category only includes the same kind of losses as fire, storm, and
shipwreck.275 The common denominator of these enumerated losses, the
court explained, is “a sudden, unexpected, or unusual event.”276 Hence,
losses resulting from “progressive deterioration of property through a
steadily operating cause or by normal depreciation” are not included in
the casualties catalog.277
Another illustration of the operation of this catalog can be found in
the tax-court decision that dealt with taxpayers’ property adjacent to the
house of the celebrity football player O.J. Simpson, who faced murder
charges.278 The lucrative neighborhood surrounding O.J. Simpson’s
house had received unprecedented public attention: It became inun-
dated for many months “with media personnel [and celebrity-enthralled
sightseers]” who “blocked streets, trespassed on neighboring residential
property, and flew overhead in helicopters in their attempts to get close
to the Simpson home.”279 According to the taxpayers, this unwelcome
invasion constituted “other casualty” that permanently devalued their
property.280
The court disagreed. The “other casualty” category, it explained,
does not encompass any casualty.281 Rather, casualties that fall into this
general category must share the characteristics of “the specifically enum-
272. 680 F.2d 91, 91 (11th Cir. 1982).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 92–93.
276. Id. at 92.
277. Id. To support this interpretation of § 165(c)(3), the court also compiled a list of
eighteen court decisions that followed the distinction between sudden and gradual losses.
Id. at 93–94. These decisions included a case featuring a sudden and unexpected, and
hence deductible, loss of trees. See Black v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347, 1351 (1977)
(recognizing loss of pine trees caused by sudden beetle infestation as deductible casualty).
278. See Chamales v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1428, 1429 (2000) (describing
location of property). For information on O.J. Simpson’s murder trial, see Douglas O.
Linder, The O.J. Simpson Trial: 1995, Famous American Trials, http://law2.umkc.edu/
faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/simpson.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing account of trial and access to transcripts and related
documents).
279. Chamales, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1429.
280. Id. at 1430.
281. See id. at 1431 (explaining characteristics necessary for inclusion in “other casu-
alty” category).
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erated casualties of fire, storm, and shipwreck.”282 The unspecified
casualties must be as sudden, unexpected, and unusual as fires, storms,
and shipwrecks.283 The court then went on to explain that, although “the
stabbing of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman was a sudden
and unexpected exertion of force,” this force was irrelevant to the
taxpayers’ case because it “was not exerted upon and did not damage
[their] property.”284 As for the influx of media, onlookers, and tres-
passers, the court decided that this casualty falls outside the catalog be-
cause it brought about a gradual, rather than instant, depreciation of the
property in question.285
Both of these decisions illustrate the difference between catalogs, on
the one hand, and rules and standards, on the other hand. The “other
casualty” category has an unlimited potential for being filled in with
casualties that bear family resemblance to fires, storms, and shipwrecks.
Hence, it cannot be considered a rule. This category is also not a stan-
dard because it sets up a framework for factual, policy-free categoriza-
tions of alleged casualties as sudden, unexpected, and unusual. If “other
casualty” were a standard, the taxpayers in the two examples could
possibly convince the court to recognize their misfortunes as deductible
casualties.
Another example of a catalog is provided by § 2043(b)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which prohibits deduction in the case of “a relin-
quishment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or of a stat-
utory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights
in the decedent’s property or estate.”286 In other words, the estate cannot
deduct the decedent’s obligation to his or her spouse if all he received in
return was the relinquishment of dower, curtesy, statutory estate, or other
marital right. “Dower” and “curtesy” are common-law rights in the dece-
dent’s land that move to his or her widow or widower,287 unless they are
substituted statutorily by a different entitlement (“statutory estate”).
Given the catalog formulation of the provision, the residual “other
marital rights” category cannot be construed to encompass any marital
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. I.R.C. § 2043(b)(1) (2012). This rule must be read together with I.R.C.
§ 2053(c)(1)(A).
287. The court in Herrmann v. Commissioner described the history of the rights:
At common law, “dower” entitled a widow to a life interest in one-
third of the land of which her husband had been seised at any time
during marriage and which was inheritable by the issue of husband and
wife. “Curtesy” entitled a widower to a life estate in all lands so held by
his wife, but only if children were born of the marriage.
85 F.3d 1032, 1034 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson,
Wills, Trusts, and Estates 375–76 (4th ed. 1990)).
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entitlement. Rather, it ought to be interpreted as covering only those
entitlements that are substantively equivalent to dower, curtesy, or a statu-
tory estate.
This is precisely what Judge Guido Calabresi did in Herrmann v.
Commissioner.288 He explained that dower, curtesy, and statutory estates
have a common denominator: All of them are contingent entitlements
that ripen upon dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce.289 When
a spouse relinquishes any such entitlement prior to its ripening, she adds
nothing to the estate’s economic value.290 Recognizing the decedent’s
parallel obligation to his spouse as deductible would therefore diminish
his taxable estate “by the full amount of what he gave up, in exchange for
a waiver that added nothing to it.”291 Based on this understanding, Judge
Calabresi ruled that “other marital rights” encompass only those enti-
tlements that the spouse will acquire upon becoming a widow or
divorcee.292
Section 2043(b)(1), too, illustrates the advantage of catalogs over
standards and rules. To prevent easy depletion of taxable estates,293 the
lawmaker could set up a standard that would disallow any deduction of
the deceased’s obligations to his spouse that remove assets from, while
adding no value to, his estate. Any such standard, however, would make
the law manipulable and unpredictable. As an alternative, the lawmaker
could lay down a rule rendering the deceased’s obligations to his spouse
nondeductible when they are reciprocated solely by the relinquishment
of a contingent marital right that accrues upon dissolution of the mar-
riage. Such a rule would suffer from lack of clarity, which would increase
actors’ costs of learning the law and litigating. The chosen catalog re-
duces those costs by providing paradigmatic examples of nondeductible
obligations while avoiding the twin vice of unpredictability and misuse.
CONCLUSION
All legal scholars owe a great intellectual debt to the rules/standards
dichotomy. It has spawned an important body of scholarship and greatly
enriched our understanding of the law and its operation. Furthermore, it
has become the organizing principle for legal theory. Notwithstanding
these important accomplishments, the vantage point offered by the
288. See id. at 1032 (comparing nature of disputed right to dower and curtesy to dem-
onstrate granting deduction would undermine § 2043(b)(1)).
289. Id. at 1035.
290. See, e.g., id. at 1039 (“Had they divorced, [the relinquished] right would have
ripened. But no divorce took place and the couple was still married when Herbert died.
Harriet’s waiver, therefore, did not add a penny to Herbert’s estate.”).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1039–41.
293. See id. (explaining § 2043(b)(1) aims at preventing husbands and wives from
making contracts with sole purpose of depleting estate and reducing its tax).
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rules/standards dichotomy is incomplete. As this Essay showed, the
rules/standards dichotomy disregards the existence of a third category of
legal commands: catalogs. Catalogs are legal concepts that are structured
around an expressed enumeration of examples followed by a general
category that includes other unenumerated items that have a
Wittgensteinian family resemblance to the specified ones.
In addition to unveiling the presence of catalogs, this Essay aspired
to make three discrete contributions to the canon of legal jurisprudence.
First, as a positive matter, it demonstrated the ubiquity of catalogs in the
legal system. Specifically, it showed that catalogs are at work in many
areas of the law including bankruptcy, evidence, environmental law,
copyright, criminal law, torts, constitutional law, and taxation. Second, as
a conceptual matter, this Essay explained that catalogs constitute an
independent legal concept. Concretely, it argued that catalogs require
courts to engage in a very different interpretive exercise than under
either rules or standards and that the use of catalogs effects a different
division of powers between the courts and the legislature. Finally, from a
normative perspective, this Essay has shown that in many cases catalogs
can outperform rules and standards in promoting legislative goals and
societal values. This Essay’s hope is that the unveiling of catalogs will
generate future work that will transcend the boundaries of the extant
rules-versus-standards debate.
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